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31 
Article 
Truth and Lies in the Workplace: 
Employer Speech and the First 
Amendment 
Helen Norton† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Employers speak to workers (and other audiences) about a 
range of matters related to the terms and conditions of their 
workers’ employment, such as pay, benefits, hours, hazards, 
economic security, and available legal rights. Employer speech 
on these topics can, and often does, valuably inform workers’ 
decisions about jobs and related issues of great life importance. 
But employer speech on these topics can also inflict sub-
stantial harm. More specifically, employers’ lies, misrepresen-
tations, or nondisclosures about the terms and conditions of 
employment can distort and sometimes even coerce workers’ 
important life decisions—for example, decisions about whether 
to take, decline, keep, or leave a job, or whether to retire or ac-
cept a severance agreement.1 Relatedly, employers’ nondisclo-
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 1. See Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protec-
tions in the Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715, 719–21 (1997) (“[T]here are 
abundant examples of companies that mislead their employees. These compa-
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sures, lies, or misrepresentations about workers’ legal rights 
can frustrate key workplace protections by skewing workers’ 
decisions about whether to unionize, report illegal workplace 
conditions, or advocate for different terms and conditions of 
employment.2 Consider one recent example, where an employ-
er’s employee handbook denied the existence of federal and 
state laws that require overtime pay: “There is no overtime pay 
as there is no shortage for qualified labor. Any hours worked 
beyond 40 are paid straight time and [it] is understood by the 
employee that the extra hours are a privilege.”3 Workers con-
fronted with employer misrepresentations of this nature—
especially (but not only) low-wage and other vulnerable work-
ers—may be unlikely to question, rebut, or resist them for fear 
of losing their jobs.4 
Federal, state, and local governments have long sought to 
address such harms by requiring that employers affirmatively 
disclose truthful information about workers’ legal rights and 
working conditions. Examples include statutory requirements 
that employers post notice of workers’ rights under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act,5 the Occupational Health and Safety Act,6 
 
nies may cause their employees to believe, for instance, that their jobs are 
more secure than they in fact are, that their jobs will be better than they actu-
ally turn out to be, or that their health benefits are assured after retirement 
when in fact they can be revoked at the will of the company.”); Richard P. 
Perna, Deceitful Employers: Common Law Fraud as a Mechanism To Remedy 
Intentional Employer Misrepresentation in Hiring, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
233, 234–38 (2005) (describing examples of workers’ detrimental “reliance on 
false statements or promises the employer made during pre-hiring negotia-
tions”); Lorraine A. Schmall, Telling the Truth About Golden Handshakes: Exit 
Incentives and Fiduciary Duties, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 169, 171 (2001) 
(“Companies are often insulated from liability when they mislead, mischarac-
terize, or delude employees into accepting early retirement, or even fail to tell 
them an incentive is anticipated.”). 
 2. See Peter D. DeChiara, The Right To Know: An Argument for Inform-
ing Employees of Their Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 455 (1995) (describing employers’ misrepresentations 
of law in union organizing campaigns). 
 3. Reyes v. Snowcap Creamery, Inc., No. 11-cv-02755-JLK-KMT, 2014 
WL 2459740, at *6 n.3 (D. Colo. June 2, 2014). 
 4. See Charlotte S. Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, Threats, and the 
Silencing of the Brown Collar Workforce, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 779, 789 (2013) 
(“[Employers’ nondisclosures and false threats of adverse employment action] 
may be particularly effective in silencing groups such as brown[-]collar work-
ers who already have significant reasons not to engage in claims-making at 
work.”). 
 5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 6. Id. § 657(c). 
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the Family and Medical Leave Act,7 the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act,8 and other federal employment laws, as well as a 
range of state laws requiring disclosure of wages or other spe-
cific terms and conditions of employment.9 Governments have 
also sought to address such harms by prohibiting employers 
from lying about or misrepresenting workers’ rights or working 
conditions. Examples here are fewer in number, but they in-
clude the National Labor Relations Act’s (NLRA) treatment of 
certain employer lies (and other communications) as coercive 
speech in violation of the Act,10 certain statutory and common 
law causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresenta-
tion,11 and the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act’s 
(ERISA) treatment of certain employer lies (and other commu-
nications) about employee benefits as a breach of fiduciary du-
ty.12 Commentators and policymakers have further proposed a 
variety of additional measures to address related harms that 
would prohibit certain lies or misrepresentations by—or re-
quire certain truthful disclosures of—employers. Examples in-
clude proposals to require employers to disclose salary ranges, 
various job-related hazards, and on-the-job injury rates, as well 
as proposals to prohibit employer lies about related terms and 
conditions of employment.13 
 
 7. Id. § 2619(a). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 12115 (2012). 
 9. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-71f (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 388-7 
(2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.13 (2015); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(1)(a) (McKin-
ney 2015); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 260.4 (West 2009). 
 10. See infra notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
 11. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 970 (West 2011) (prohibiting knowingly 
false representations intended to influence workers’ choice of employment); 
COL. REV. STAT. § 8-2-104 (2015) (prohibiting false or deceptive representa-
tions about certain terms and conditions of employment). 
 12. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (describing “know-
ing and significant” deceit by employer to save money at the expense of a 
plan’s beneficiaries as a violation of fiduciary duty and thus of ERISA). 
 13. E.g., Jeremy Blasi, Using Compliance Transparency To Combat Wage 
Theft, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95 (2012) (urging enactment of laws 
requiring employers to disclose their record of compliance or noncompliance 
with wage and hour laws); Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for 
Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2011) (proposing a mandatory 
disclosure regime of job-related hazards and injuries, contractual job security 
provisions, work-family policies, agreements waiving and affecting legal 
rights, and salary ranges); Greenfield, supra note 1, at 785–88 (urging the en-
actment of federal legislation to prohibit employer fraud); Schmall, supra note 
1 (proposing changes to ERISA to address its failure to protect workers from 
“fraud, lack of disclosure, or reneged promises”). 
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These important measures, however, are now increasingly 
vulnerable to constitutional attack in light of the recent an-
tiregulatory turn in First Amendment law, in which corporate 
and other commercial entities seek—with growing success—to 
insulate their speech from regulation in a variety of settings.14 
Examples of this turn include challenges to disclosure require-
ments in a range of commercial contexts, as well as Citizens 
United v. FEC and related decisions invalidating the govern-
ment’s regulation of corporations’ political speech.15 The Su-
preme Court’s decision in United States v. Alvarez adds to these 
complications by leaving unsettled the constitutionality of the 
government’s efforts to regulate lies and misrepresentations in 
several areas.16 A number of thoughtful commentators have 
documented this trend’s implications for settings involving cor-
porations’ speech to voters and consumers.17 This Article con-
 
 14. See John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: 
History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 223–24 (2015) 
(“[C]orporations have increasingly displaced individuals as direct beneficiaries 
of First Amendment rights . . . .”). 
 15. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 16. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012); see also Tamara R. Piety, The Heroic Corpora-
tion and First Amendment Romanticism: A Response to Professors Redish and 
Neuborne, 92 TEX. L. REV. 181, 199–200 (2014) (“[T]raditional First Amend-
ment doctrine protects a great deal of false speech, sometimes explicitly and 
sometimes as a function of the strict scrutiny standard of review.”). 
 17. E.g., Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2015) (“[W]hat has been called First Amendment 
opportunism[] [occurs] where litigants raise novel free speech claims that may 
involve the repackaging of other types of legal arguments. . . . First Amend-
ment expansionism[] [occurs] where the First Amendment’s territory pushes 
outward to encompass ever more areas of law.”); Tamara R. Piety, “A Neces-
sary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 51 
(2012) (“Much of the work of the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, and countless other governmental agencies is 
predicated on the government’s ability to pursue and punish not only fraud, 
but also statements which may be misleading or on the government’s ability to 
require various disclosures in order to conduct certain businesses. After Sor-
rell, many of these laws will be challenged.”); Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, 
Commentary, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM  
165, 167 (2015), http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ 
vol128_PostShanor2.pdf (“It is no exaggeration to observe that the First 
Amendment has become a powerful engine of constitutional deregulation. The 
echoes of Lochner are palpable.”); Michael R. Siebecker, Securities Regulation, 
Social Responsibility, and a New Institutional First Amendment, 29 J.L. & 
POL. 535, 535 (2014) (“[A] looming jurisprudential train wreck between the 
Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine and its disparate approach to 
corporate political speech threatens the integrity of the securities regulation 
regime.”); Rebecca Tushnet, COOL Story: Country of Origin Labeling and the 
First Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 25, 26 (2015) (“[T]he First Amend-
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tributes to that discussion by examining these developments’ 
significant but under-explored First Amendment implications 
for the workplace. 
To this end, this Article explores how First Amendment 
law may be changing in ways that undercut the government’s 
efforts to inform and empower workers by casting doubt on its 
ability to require truth or prohibit falsity in a variety of set-
tings.18 This Article then considers the circumstances under 
which we should instead understand the First Amendment to 
permit the government to require employers to tell the truth 
about workers’ legal rights and other working conditions. In so 
doing, this Article focuses specifically on employers’ objectively 
verifiable speech about workers’ rights and other working con-
ditions (such as pay, benefits, job security, hours, and hazards) 
and uses the term “employer speech” as shorthand for employ-
ers’ speech on these topics. Because federal and state statutory 
protections set certain baseline conditions for the employment 
relationship that cannot be negotiated away (for example, by 
setting minimum wages or maximum hours), this Article treats 
employer speech about workers’ legal rights as a subset of em-
ployer speech about the terms and conditions of employment. 
More specifically, the constitutionality of governmental ef-
forts to regulate employer speech remains both undertheorized 
and unsettled. As just one illustration, courts and commenta-
tors have yet to consider, much less offer, a comprehensive ap-
proach to whether and when speech by employers on these top-
ics should be characterized as political speech subject to greater 
constitutional protection (and thus less regulation), commercial 
speech subject to less protection (and thus greater regulation), 
or something else entirely. 
 
ment has become the new Lochner, used by profit-seeking actors to interfere 
with the regulatory state in a way that substantive due process no longer al-
lows.”). Thomas Jackson and John Jeffries were among the first to express 
concern about the potential deregulatory implications of the Supreme Court’s 
protection of commercial speech. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, 
Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 
VA. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
 18. For example, as discussed in more detail infra notes 43–45 and ac-
companying text, the D.C. Circuit struck down the National Labor Relations 
Board’s proposal to require employers to post notice of workers’ rights under 
the NLRA, relying on free speech arguments to invalidate workplace disclo-
sures of the sort that other employment statutes have long required. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013), overruled on other 
grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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This history—with its gaps and inconsistencies—reminds 
us of the limits of traditional speech categories and encourages 
a turn to theoretical and doctrinal assessments of speech regu-
lations in other contexts. These alternative contexts largely es-
chew such traditional categories to focus instead on the dynam-
ics of certain speaker-listener relationships. Indeed, although 
many think of the First Amendment as primarily focused on 
protecting speakers of conscience, most First Amendment theo-
ries urge the protection of speech at least in part to further lis-
teners’ autonomy, enlightenment, and self-governance inter-
ests.19 For this reason, theory and doctrine in other settings 
sometimes support the content-based regulation of expression 
to improve the communicative discourse and thus protect lis-
teners’ First Amendment interests.20 This approach is especial-
ly tolerant of the government’s efforts, in certain contexts, to 
prohibit lies and misrepresentations and to require truthful 
disclosures to inform and empower listeners’ decision making. 
The choice between a speaker- or listener-centered ap-
proach for First Amendment purposes sometimes turns on 
whether the contested expression occurs in a relationship 
where the speaker lacks dignitary interests of its own (e.g., a 
publicly held for-profit corporation as opposed to an individual). 
Although the protection of dignitary speakers’ choice to lie—or 
to decline to tell the truth—may at least sometimes further au-
tonomy interests protected by the First Amendment,21 the pro-
tection of lies or nondisclosures by speakers without such digni-
tary interests does not. For these reasons, a number of 
commentators have explained the Court’s commercial speech 
doctrine as justified in part on the grounds that commercial en-
tities have no intrinsic expressive interests of their own; gov-
ernments can thus privilege listeners’ interests as consumers in 
receiving accurate information both by prohibiting commercial 
actors’ lies and misrepresentations and by requiring them to 
make truthful disclosures about a range of transaction-related 
matters.22 
 
 19. See Post & Shanor, supra note 17, at 170 (“The constitutional value of 
commercial speech lies in the rights of listeners to receive information so that 
they might make intelligent and informed decisions. Ordinary First Amend-
ment doctrine, by contrast, focuses on the rights of speakers, not listeners.”). 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
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Even if the contested speech is uttered by a speaker with 
her own dignitary interests, theory and doctrine still sometimes 
support a listener-centered approach for First Amendment 
purposes when the expression occurs within a relationship in 
which content-based regulation can help improve the communi-
cative discourse. This can be the case where the listener has 
less information, expertise, or power than the speaker—i.e., 
where the speaker has greater (and sometimes even exclusive) 
informational access and listeners’ opportunities for 
counterspeech and exit may be constrained. Examples include 
(but are not limited to) speech by professionals and other fidu-
ciaries to their clients and beneficiaries where speakers’ insin-
cerity and inaccuracy threaten especially grave harms to their 
listeners. Although the individual speakers in these relation-
ships may have substantial expressive interests of their own, 
governments—and courts—sometimes choose to privilege lis-
teners’ autonomy, enlightenment, and self-governance interests 
in receiving accurate information by prohibiting lies and re-
quiring truthful disclosures by these speakers. In other words, 
relationships matter for free speech purposes in ways that 
sometimes support the choice to privilege listeners over speak-
ers when their First Amendment interests are in tension. 
This, in turn, invites us to consider the nature of the com-
municative relationship between employers and workers.23 Our 
constitutional comfort (or discomfort) with government’s efforts 
to regulate employer speech in this context depends on how we 
characterize this relationship and the resulting flow of infor-
mation and power within the workplace. Even if some employ-
ers have dignitary speech interests of their own (a premise, as 
discussed below, that remains contested24), employer speech on 
these topics takes place in a communicative relationship in 
which workers are comparatively disadvantaged in terms of in-
formation and power. More specifically, the employment rela-
 
 23. Although employment law has traditionally focused on regulating the 
relationship between “employers” and their “employees,” the emergence of the 
“sharing” or “gig” economy demonstrates how those who are hard to fit in tra-
ditional employer/employee categories increasingly control access to work. 
These developments invite us to broaden our understanding of the universe of 
actors who shape access to job opportunities, as well as our understanding of 
how they can use speech to expand or constrain those opportunities. See Ken-
neth G. Dau-Schmidt, Labor Law 2.0: The Impact of New Information Tech-
nology on the Employment Relationship and the Relevance of the NLRA, 64 
EMORY L.J. 1583 (2015). 
 24. See infra notes 89–96 and accompanying text. 
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tionship is riddled with information asymmetries: employers 
know considerably more than workers about the terms and 
conditions of employment, about current and future industry 
and economic projections, and—as repeat players with greater 
resources—about available legal protections. Moreover, work-
ers also experience significant power disadvantage, as employ-
ers’ control over workers’ economic livelihood also permits them 
to control workers’ expression and sometimes even their physi-
cal liberty (e.g., by compelling workers’ attendance at “captive 
audience” meetings25). 
Because of these information and power asymmetries, this 
Article asserts that a focus on employer speech as occurring 
within a listener-centered relationship better and more coher-
ently furthers key First Amendment values than do efforts to 
force employer speech to fit within existing and often unsatis-
factory constitutional categories. Because workers’ interests as 
listeners are frustrated by employers’ lies and nondisclosures, a 
listener-centered view of workplace relationships would under-
stand the First Amendment to permit government to prohibit 
employers from lying about certain workplace issues, as well as 
to require employers affirmatively to tell the truth by compel-
ling them to disclose information about those matters. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I offers a brief 
history of the courts’ approach to employer speech that reveals 
the construction of new First Amendment barriers to govern-
mental efforts to inform and empower workers. Part II de-
scribes free speech theory and doctrine in other settings in 
which listeners have less information or power than speakers, 
and thus where content-based speech regulation sometimes 
helps improve the communicative discourse consistent with the 
First Amendment. Part III asserts that employer speech occurs 
within a communicative relationship that involves information 
and power asymmetries such that workers’ First Amendment 
interests as listeners are frustrated by employers’ lies and non-
disclosures. Part III then explores in more detail what this 
means specifically for the regulation of truth and lies in and 
about the workplace and proposes that the First Amendment 
should be understood to permit government to require employ-
ers to disclose objectively verifiable information about workers’ 
rights and other working conditions, as well as to prohibit em-
 
 25. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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ployer lies or misrepresentations about these matters that 
threaten to coerce or manipulate workers’ choices. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMPLOYER SPEECH AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT   
To date, courts and agencies have grappled with First 
Amendment challenges involving employer speech about work-
ers’ rights and other working conditions in just a few discrete 
areas, with little effort to reconcile or connect them. The consti-
tutionality of governmental efforts to regulate truth and lies in 
and about the workplace thus remains both undertheorized and 
unsettled. Moreover, as discussed below, courts in recent years 
have erected new First Amendment barriers to these measures. 
A. EMPLOYERS’ ANTIUNION SPEECH 
Courts and commentators have most extensively discussed 
employer speech (as I use the term here26) in the context of un-
ion representation campaigns—that is, employer speech urging 
workers to vote against unionization. As explained below, in re-
cent years courts and the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB or the Board) have become increasingly willing to treat 
employer lies and misrepresentations in this setting as protect-
ed expression. 
For a short period after the National Labor Relations Act’s 
enactment in 1935, the NLRB interpreted the statute to prohib-
it employers from directly communicating any views about un-
ionization to their workers during these campaigns.27 The Su-
preme Court soon suggested that the First Amendment 
prohibited such an interpretation,28 and the 1947 Taft-Hartley 
amendments to the Act expressly protected employer speech as 
a statutory matter.29 More specifically, § 8(c) of the NLRA pro-
vides that: 
 
 26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 27. See Am. Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 131–34 (1942), enforce-
ment denied, 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 28. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537–38 (1945). 
 29. Archibald Cox characterized the 1935 Wagner Act as reflecting the 
congressional policy determination “that the Government should affirmatively 
encourage union organization and collective bargaining,” while the 1947 Taft-
Hartley amendments “represent an abandonment of the policy of affirmatively 
encouraging the spread of collective bargaining, and the striking of a new bal-
ance between protection of the right to self-organization and various opposing 
claims.” Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 
1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1947). 
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The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemina-
tion thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, 
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under 
any of the provisions of this [Act], if such expression contains no 
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.30 
Section 8(c)’s language has generated a great deal of debate 
over whether and when employer speech involves an unpro-
tected “threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit” within 
the meaning of the statute—that is, when employer speech is 
impermissibly “coercive.”31 Courts and the NLRB have some-
times interpreted § 8(c) to prohibit certain employer lies or mis-
representations as coercive and thus actionable under § 8(a) as 
unfair labor practices.32 For example, the Court has held that 
an employer’s false (as well as true) threats that employees 
would lose their jobs if they voted to unionize were sufficiently 
coercive of economically vulnerable workers to be unprotected 
by the First Amendment and § 8(c).33 In addition to false 
threats, the NLRB has found some employer (and union) lies or 
misrepresentations about workers’ legal rights to be impermis-
sibly coercive, and thus actionable as unfair labor practices, be-
cause of their capacity to skew workers’ choice to exercise those 
 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012); see also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 
U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (describing § 8(c) as “merely implement[ing] the First 
Amendment”). 
 31. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LA-
BOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 177 (2d ed. 2004) 
(“[Employer speech can constitute coercion] if it explicitly threatens loss of 
employment, loss of pay, loss of promotion, or violence if the listener votes for 
the union or if the union wins the election.”). In certain contexts, moreover, an 
employer’s promise of benefits can sometimes operate as coercively as threats 
of reprisal. See NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (“The dan-
ger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist in-
side the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the 
source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits 
must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.”). 
 32. Note that § 8(c) also protects noncoercive union speech from liability 
under § 8(b), which prohibits unions from engaging in unfair labor practices. 
29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). 
 33. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617–18 (“[A]ny balancing of [employee] rights must 
take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employ-
ers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to 
pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dis-
missed by a more disinterested ear. . . . If there is any implication that an em-
ployer may or may not take action solely on his own initiative for reasons un-
related to economic necessities and known only to him, the statement is no 
longer a reasonable prediction based on available facts but a threat of retalia-
tion based on misrepresentation and coercion, and as such without the protec-
tion of the First Amendment.”). 
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rights (e.g., an employer’s misrepresentations to workers that it 
could permanently replace strikers protesting unfair labor 
practices).34 At other times, however, courts and the NLRB 
have declined to characterize employers’ lies or misrepresenta-
tions about workplace law as coercive and have thus treated 
them as protected by § 8(c) from unfair labor practices liabil-
ity.35 
While § 8(c) protects employers’ noncoercive speech from 
liability as an unfair labor practice under NLRA § 8(a), it does 
not address whether or when other legal provisions may regu-
late employers’ noncoercive speech. The NLRB has thus at 
times taken the position that noncoercive employer (or union) 
speech—including lies—can justify setting aside the results of a 
union representation election when it manipulates or otherwise 
improperly influences workers’ assessment of the value of un-
ionization and thus violates the Board’s “laboratory conditions” 
doctrine that seeks to determine workers’ true preferences.36 As 
an example of lies found to be impermissibly manipulative of 
workers’ decisions under this doctrine, the NLRB and courts 
have at times indicated their willingness to set aside election 
results based on a party’s false representations on “matters of 
racial interest.”37 As an illustration, the Sixth Circuit applied 
 
 34. See Nat’l Micronetics, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 993, 995–96 (1985). 
 35. See John W. Galbreath & Co., 288 N.L.R.B. 876, 877 (1988); Furr’s 
Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1300, 1300 n.10 (1982); County Line Cheese Co., 265 
N.L.R.B. 1519, 1519 (1982); see also GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 31, at 191 
(“The Board’s disinclination to intervene on account of misrepresentations ap-
plies to misstatements of law as much as to statements of fact.”). As I have ex-
plored elsewhere, the line between coercive and noncoercive speech is deeply 
contested in a variety of expressive contexts. Helen Norton, The Government’s 
Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73, 94 (2015) (discussing philosophers’ 
and legal commentators’ long-standing struggles to determine when speech 
rises to the level of coercion). 
 36. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (“In election proceed-
ings, it is the Board’s function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment 
may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine 
the uninhibited desires of the employees. . . . When, in the rare extreme case, 
the standard drops too low, because of our fault or that of others, the requisite 
laboratory conditions are not present and the experiment must be conducted 
over again.”); see also Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Rep-
resentation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 549 (1993) 
(“[T]he Board [in General Shoe] uncoupled the question of whether conduct 
was an unfair labor practice from the question of whether such conduct re-
quired the Board to overturn election results.”). 
 37. See KI (USA) Corp. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 256, 260 (6th Cir. 1994) (setting 
aside election results upon finding that the union had falsely represented the 
employer’s views on racial matters); Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71–72 
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this standard to uphold the NLRB’s decision to set aside an 
election result upon finding that the employer had manufac-
tured racist propaganda and fraudulently distributed it as the 
work of the union.38 
In recent decades, however, the NLRB has taken an in-
creasingly hands-off approach to lies and misrepresentations in 
this context, equating union representation elections to politi-
cal elections in which lies remain largely unregulated.39 Its cur-
rent position remains that of Midland National Life Insurance 
Co., where it stated that: 
[W]e will no longer probe into the truth or falsity of the parties’ cam-
paign statements, and we will not set elections aside on the basis of 
misleading campaign statements. We will, however, intervene in cas-
es where a party has used forged documents which render the voters 
unable to recognize propaganda for what it is.40 
The agency now sets aside election results on the basis of 
lies deemed noncoercive only when they take the form of lies 
about who is responsible for certain election-related speech 
(that is, forgery) and not those that involve other deliberate 
misrepresentations of fact or law.41 The Board (and commenta-
tors) has largely justified its growing reluctance to regulate 
employer lies on policy grounds, but some have suggested that 
 
(1962) (“So long . . . as a party limits itself to truthfully setting forth another 
party’s position on matters of racial interest and does not deliberately seek to 
overstress and exacerbate racial feeling by irrelevant, inflammatory appeals, 
we shall not set aside an election on this ground. However, the burden will be 
on the party making use of a racial message to establish that it was truthful 
and germane . . . .”). 
 38. Ishikawa Gasket Am., Inc., 337 N.L.R.B. 175 (2001), aff ’d, 354 F.3d 
534 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 39. See Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 132–33 (1982). 
 40. Id.; see also Affiliated Midwest Hospital, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1094 
(1982) (extending Midland to hold that the Board will not set aside election 
results based on parties’ misrepresentations about the Board’s actions and de-
cisions). For a summary of the Board’s back-and-forth approach to regulating 
lies and misrepresentations, see Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 736 
F.2d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 41. Courts have generally followed suit, although at times some have re-
sisted the Board’s approach to lies in this setting as too deferential. See NLRB 
v. New Columbus Nursing Home, Inc., 720 F.2d 726, 729 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(“Some misrepresentations may be so material and fraudulent as to under-
mine the employees’ freedom of choice, rendering their section 7 right to self-
organization a nullity. Were this such a case, the Board’s flat insistence, under 
Midland, upon certifying the results of the fraudulent election might consti-
tute legal error.”). 
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any efforts to regulate such speech could raise First Amend-
ment concerns as well.42 
Not only are courts and the NLRB increasingly likely to 
treat employer lies and misrepresentations as protected ex-
pression, but corporate and other commercial entities also in-
creasingly resist—with some success—the government’s efforts 
to require them to post truthful disclosures in the workplace. 
For example, in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. NLRB, the 
D.C. Circuit interpreted § 8(c) to deny the NLRB the power to 
require employers to post notices of workers’ NLRA rights.43 
Under the NLRB’s proposed rule, employers who failed to post 
the required notice could be found to have engaged in an unfair 
labor practice under § 8(a). Even though many other employ-
ment statutes have long—and, until recently, uncontro-
versially44—required employers to post similar notices of work-
ers’ legal rights in the workplace, the National Association of 
Manufacturers and other groups alleged that the NLRB’s no-
 
 42. See Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, Free Speech and the NLRB’s Laboratory 
Conditions Doctrine, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204 (2002) (suggesting that the Board’s 
“laboratory conditions” doctrine would violate the First Amendment if applied 
to regulate noncoercive speech). 
 43. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The pan-
el’s decision was overruled in part on other grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). There the en banc D.C. 
Circuit overruled portions of panel decisions in three different cases that it de-
scribed as offering an unduly limited reading of Supreme Court precedent to 
apply rational-basis scrutiny to compelled commercial disclosures only “to cas-
es in which the government points to an interest in correcting deception.” Id. 
at 22. The en banc court, however, overturned neither the National Ass’n of 
Manufacturers panel’s invalidation of the Board’s proposed notice-posting rule 
nor its free speech analysis of that rule. The Fourth Circuit struck down the 
Board’s proposed notice-posting rule on administrative law grounds without 
addressing the challengers’ free speech arguments. See Chamber of Commerce 
v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 166 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 44. See Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 519 F.2d 84, 89 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (“Lastly, Lake Butler argues that the OSHA requirement that the 
information sign be posted at its clothing factory violates its First Amendment 
rights to freedom of speech. However, Lake Butler does not cite us to any cases 
on the issue and we are hard put to find any. The argument is seemingly non-
sensical for, if the government has a right to promulgate these regulations, it 
seems obvious that they have a right to statutorily require that they be posted 
in a place that would be obvious to the intended beneficiaries of the statute—
Lake Butler’s employees. The posting of the notice does not by any stretch of 
the imagination reflect one way or the other on the views of the employer. It 
merely states what the law requires. The employer may differ with the wis-
dom of the law and this requirement even to the point as done here, of chal-
lenging its validity. . . . But the First Amendment which gives him the full 
right to contest validity to the bitter end cannot justify his refusal to post a 
notice Congress thought to be essential.” (citations omitted)). 
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tice-posting rule compelled employers to engage in speech 
against their will in violation of § 8(c) as well as the First 
Amendment. The D.C. Circuit found that the rule violated 
§ 8(c) without expressly addressing the constitutional claim, 
but its statutory analysis relied exclusively on First Amend-
ment law. More specifically, it drew from a range of First 
Amendment precedent in both commercial and noncommercial 
settings to conclude that employers’ refusal to post the govern-
ment’s notice was itself speech protected by § 8(c) (and, by im-
plication, the First Amendment). The court’s broad view of em-
ployers’ speech rights suggests a willingness to find other 
disclosure requirements to violate the First Amendment, and 
employer groups have mounted related free speech challenges 
to similar measures.45 
The courts’ protective approach to employer speech con-
trasts starkly with their very different treatment of unions’ 
speech in related contexts.46 More specifically, courts have often 
justified substantial regulation of union picketing and other 
pro-labor expression not only because they have been relatively 
quick to view such speech as coercive, but also because they 
have often characterized it as economically motivated speech on 
matters of private concern—and thus less deserving of consti-
tutional protection than speech on matters of public concern.47 
 
 45. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Perez, 103 F. Supp. 3d 7, 15–19 (D.D.C. 
2015) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the Department of Labor’s 
requirement that federal contractors post notice of workers’ NLRA rights). 
There the district court distinguished the D.C. Circuit’s holding in National 
Ass’n of Manufacturers v. NLRB as limited to § 8(c), even while acknowledging 
that “the court in [National Ass’n of Manufacturers] did rely on First Amend-
ment jurisprudence to give content to the protections afforded by section 8(c).” 
Id. at 15. 
 46. See Cynthia Estlund, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free 
Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938, 960 (1982) 
(“The Supreme Court has thus incorporated into First Amendment doctrine a 
hierarchy of values that is more consistent with the free enterprise system 
than with the system of freedom of expression.”); Richard Michael Fischl, La-
bor, Management, and the First Amendment: Whose Rights Are These, Any-
way?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 729, 741 (1989) (“[M]y principal point is that labor 
is different—that it seems to enjoy a special exemption from the constitutional 
protection available to other citizens because of assumptions we share about 
what it means to be an employee.”); Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and 
Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1, 47 (2011) (“[I]t is difficult if not impossible to reconcile existing labor speech 
doctrine with First Amendment cases arising in other contexts—yet the dis-
tinctions have proven resilient, albeit with shifting rationales.”). 
 47. The Court has most often relied on distinctions between speech on 
matters of public or private concern to assess First Amendment claims by de-
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As Charlotte Garden has observed, “The Court’s most recent 
explanation for its different treatment of unions, as compared 
to other types of groups (such as the Westboro Church), rests 
on its perception that union picketing is essentially economic” 
speech on a matter of private, rather than public concern.48 In 
contrast, courts to date have not considered whether employer 
speech in the context of union organizing campaigns should be 
characterized as self-interested speech on economic matters 
(less protected from regulation) as opposed to speech on mat-
ters of public concern (largely protected from regulation).49 Of 
 
fendants in defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress cases 
and by public employees. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 
(1968) (public employee); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defama-
tion). Holding that “speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection,” 
the Court has also stated that “First Amendment protections are often less 
rigorous” with respect to speech on matters of private concern. Snyder v. 
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011). The Court has indicated that speech involves 
matters of public concern when it “is a subject of legitimate news interest; that 
is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.” San 
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam). However, “the bounda-
ries of the public concern test are not well defined.” Id. at 83. 
 48. Garden, supra note 46, at 21; see also Catherine L. Fisk & Jessica 
Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First Amendment, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 277, 308–09 (2015) (“Restrictions on labor picketing have sometimes 
been justified on a separate ground: that labor picketing is ‘economic’ rather 
than ‘political’ speech and that the state has greater power to regulate eco-
nomic activity than to regulate political activity. Courts sometimes assess the 
content of labor speech under the laxer constitutional standard used to assess 
the content of commercial speech, based upon the supposition that the two 
forms of speech are analogous.”). 
On the other hand, a divided Court recently characterized related union 
speech as involving a matter of public concern in a context when doing so dis-
advantaged the union. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2642–43 (2014). 
There the majority held that the First Amendment did not permit a public 
employees’ union to require workers to pay dues to support its collective bar-
gaining efforts because its speech seeking to increase “wages and benefits for 
personal assistants would almost certainly mean increased expenditures un-
der the Medicaid program, and it is impossible to argue that the level of Medi-
caid funding (or, for that matter, state spending for employee benefits in gen-
eral) is not a matter of great public concern.” Id. The dissent, in contrast, 
noted the majority’s departure from longstanding precedent. Id. at 2655 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“But that view of the First Amendment interests at 
stake blinks decades’ worth of this Court’s precedents. Our decisions . . . teach 
that internal workplace speech about public employees’ wages, benefits, and 
such—that is, the prosaic stuff of collective bargaining—does not become 
speech of ‘public concern’ just because those employment terms may have 
broader consequence.”). 
 49. A number of commentators have explored the implications of extend-
ing the more protective standards long applied to employer speech to union 
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course, acknowledging that both can be true may be the more 
accurate characterization, as speech on these topics (by unions 
as well as employers) is often both economically and politically 
motivated and of both public and private concern.50 
B. EMPLOYERS’ COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Outside of the unionization context, courts sometimes treat 
employer speech about workers’ rights and working conditions 
as commercial speech subject to less First Amendment protec-
tion and thus greater governmental regulation. This analysis is 
complicated, however, by growing challenges to the premise 
that commercial speech should be subject to greater govern-
mental regulation than other types of speech. 
First, some background on commercial speech more gener-
ally. Since the 1970s, the Court has explained that commercial 
speech is worthy of First Amendment protection because of its 
informational value to listeners (that is, consumers).51 It has re-
latedly held that commercial speech that is false, misleading, or 
related to an illegal activity is entitled to no constitutional pro-
tection—and can be banned outright—because such speech 
frustrates listeners’ informational interests.52 Moreover, it has 
permitted government relatively broad leeway to require com-
mercial speakers to make truthful disclosures,53 upholding such 
 
speech as well. See, e.g., Fisk & Rutter, supra note 48; Catherine L. Fisk & 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox v. 
SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1058–62 (2013); Garden, supra 
note 46, at 19. 
 50. See Fisk & Rutter, supra note 48, at 312 (“Labor speech addresses a 
mix of economic and political concerns (but of course, so does core political 
speech).”); Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1358, 1417 (1982) (“The core ideological function served by the 
public/private distinction is to deny that the practices comprising the private 
sphere of life—the worlds of business, education, and culture, the community, 
and the family—are inextricably linked to and at least partially constituted by 
politics and law.”). 
 51. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“[T]he extension of First Amendment protec-
tion to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of 
the information such speech provides.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citi-
zen Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763–64 (1976) (emphasizing the 
value of “the free flow of commercial information” to individual consumers and 
the public more generally). 
 52. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980). 
 53. The Court applied intermediate scrutiny to laws regulating truthful 
and nonmisleading commercial speech on the premise that such speech—
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requirements when they are “reasonably related to the State’s 
interest in preventing deception of consumers.”54 Lower courts 
have also often upheld commercial disclosure requirements to 
inform consumers even when the regulated commercial speak-
ers have not engaged in deception.55 Courts have long viewed 
such disclosures as protecting listeners’ informational interests 
while posing little danger of chilling commercial speakers who 
retain strong economic incentives to speak; indeed, the Court’s 
commercial speech doctrine has relied in part on the “hardi-
ness” of commercial speech.56 In short, at least until recently,57 
courts have generally been quite tolerant of governmental ef-
forts to prohibit lies and compel disclosures in commercial set-
tings. 
Courts have only occasionally explored whether and when 
employer speech about workers’ rights and working conditions 
should be understood as commercial speech subject to greater 
governmental regulation.58 The Supreme Court specifically con-
sidered whether commercial speech includes job advertise-
ments (which often include information about the terms and 
conditions of employment) in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
 
although still of relatively low value—can helpfully inform individuals about 
their choices in the commercial realm. Id. 
 54. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (holding that disclosure requirements that 
are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing consumer decep-
tion do not violate commercial speakers’ First Amendment rights). 
 55. E.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 
2014); N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d 
Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has yet to address the question of whether ra-
tional-basis scrutiny should apply to compelled commercial disclosures intend-
ed to further listeners’ informational interests absent the government’s show-
ing of deception by the commercial speaker. 
 56. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (“The truth of 
commercial speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its dissemi-
nator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinar-
ily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or 
service that he himself provides and presumably knows more about than any-
one else. Also, commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. 
Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little like-
lihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely. Attributes 
such as these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech, may 
make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing 
the speaker.”). 
 57. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 58. As just one example, the D.C. Circuit did not consider this possibility 
when considering the constitutionality of the NLRB’s regulation of workplace 
speech in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. NLRB. See supra notes 43–45 
and accompanying text. 
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Commission on Human Relations.59 There it rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to a city antidiscrimination ordinance 
that prohibited newspapers from publishing employers’ sex-
segregated want ads.60 As it concluded: 
None [of the ads] expresses a position on whether, as a matter of so-
cial policy, certain positions ought to be filled by members of one or 
the other sex, nor do any of them criticize the Ordinance or the Com-
mission’s enforcement practices. Each is no more than a proposal of 
possible employment. The advertisements are thus classic examples 
of commercial speech.61 
The Court then treated this particular commercial speech 
as entitled to no constitutional protection because it advertised 
illegal activity in the form of discriminatory hiring practices 
that violated statutory civil rights protections.62 Lower courts 
have generally applied Pittsburgh Press to hold that employers’ 
recruitment-related speech, job advertisements, interviews, 
and other job-related negotiations (which, again, generally in-
clude information about the terms and conditions of employ-
ment) constitute commercial speech.63 Employers’ communica-
tions about the terms and conditions of employment to 
prospective or current workers thus should generally fall with-
in the definition of commercial speech under which government 
has traditionally been permitted considerable latitude to regu-
late lies and misrepresentations as well as to require truthful 
disclosures. 
More difficult questions arise when a commercial speaker’s 
expression occurs in a setting that does not involve traditional 
advertisements or negotiations or when it is combined with ar-
guably noncommercial expression. Although the Court has yet 
 
 59. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
 60. Id. at 391. 
 61. Id. at 385. 
 62. Id. at 387–88. 
 63. E.g., Valle Del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 818–19 (9th Cir. 
2013) (characterizing potential employers’ solicitation of day laborers as com-
mercial speech because it involved advertisements and negotiations for work); 
Centro de La Comunidad Hispana v. Town of Oyster Bay, 128 F. Supp. 3d 597, 
610 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (same); Calderon v. City of Vista, No. 06CV1443-L(LSP), 
2006 WL 2265112, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2006) (same); Nomi v. Regents for 
the Univ. of Minn., 796 F. Supp. 412, 417 (D. Minn. 1992) (“[Military job] re-
cruiting proposes a commercial transaction; the purpose of recruiting is to 
reach an agreement under which services will be exchanged for compensa-
tion.”), vacated as moot, 5 F.3d 332 (8th Cir. 1993); N.J. Dep’t of Labor & 
Workforce Dev. v. Crest Ultrasonics, 82 A.3d 258, 260 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2014) 
(characterizing state law that regulated job advertisements as a regulation of 
commercial speech). 
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to offer a clear definition of commercial speech for First 
Amendment purposes more generally, speech that does “no 
more than propose a commercial transaction”64 clearly consti-
tutes core commercial expression; the Court has also character-
ized commercial speech as “expression related solely to the eco-
nomic interests of the speaker and its audience.”65 That speech 
proposing a commercial transaction may be accompanied by 
other speech does not necessarily rob it of its commercial char-
acter: according to the Court, the key determination is whether 
the commercial speech is “inextricably intertwined” with oth-
erwise fully protected speech.66 For example, the Court has held 
that contraceptive advertisements constituted commercial 
speech even though the regulated mailings also included dis-
cussion of other important topics of public concern like family 
planning and sexually transmissible diseases.67 The Court there 
made clear its practical concern that “[a]dvertisers should not 
be permitted to immunize false or misleading product infor-
mation from government regulation simply by including refer-
ences to public issues.”68 
The speech at issue in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky highlights these 
definitional challenges in the context of an employer’s alleged 
lies about its treatment of its workers.69 Nike faced allegations 
that overseas workers who made Nike products were subjected 
to physical abuse and illegal working conditions—allegations 
that received extensive public attention.70 Nike refuted these 
 
 64. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizen Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385). 
 65. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
 66. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (de-
termining that “pure” speech and commercial speech were not “inextricably 
intertwined” to justify characterizing the speech as noncommercial); see Riley 
v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (“[W]e do not 
believe that the speech retains its commercial character when it is inextricably 
intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech.”). 
 67. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
 68. Id. at 68. The Bolger Court noted that the combination of three fac-
tors—advertising format, product reference, and commercial motivation—
provided “strong support” for characterizing the mailings as commercial 
speech despite their inclusion of political and other noncommercial content as 
well. Id. at 66–68. The Bolger Court also indicated, however, that each of those 
criteria need not be met before speech may be characterized as commercial. Id. 
at 67 n.14. 
 69. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 
654 (2003) (per curiam). 
 70. 539 U.S. at 656. 
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reports in a variety of communications that included press re-
leases, letters to newspaper editors, and letters to university 
athletic directors with whom it did business.71 When a plaintiff 
filed suit against Nike alleging that these communications in-
cluded factual misrepresentations in violation of California’s 
consumer protection law, Nike’s defenses included its claim 
that its speech—even if intentionally false—was protected by 
the First Amendment as political, rather than commercial, ex-
pression.72 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, only later to 
dismiss it as improvidently granted.73 
The question whether to characterize such speech as politi-
cal or commercial (which, in turn, determines the extent to 
which it may be regulated consistent with the First Amend-
ment) continues to generate considerable controversy. Tamara 
Piety, for example, emphasizes the speaker’s identity as a cor-
poration engaged in for-profit activities to urge that such ex-
pression always be characterized as commercial and thus sub-
ject to greater government regulation.74 Others focus on the 
expression’s motive or format (for example, whether its audi-
ence includes consumers), while others argue for a narrow defi-
nition of commercial speech limited only to traditional adver-
tisements.75 Still others urge that commercial speech should 
 
 71. Id. at 658. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 655. The Court’s dismissal of certiorari thus left in place the 
California Supreme Court’s ruling that Nike’s statements constituted 
regulable commercial speech “[b]ecause the messages in question were di-
rected by a commercial speaker to a commercial audience, and because they 
made representations of fact about the speaker’s own business operations for 
the purpose of promoting sales of its products . . . .” 45 P.3d at 247. 
 74. TAMARA PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12 (2012) (pro-
posing to expand the definition of low-value and thus less protected commer-
cial speech to include all speech by for-profit entities because all such speech is 
“essentially promotional”); see Piety, supra note 16, at 200 (“A commercial en-
tity will only have an interest in conveying truthful information to consumers 
about its product if that truthful information will help it sell the product. If it 
does not help to sell the product or, worse still, depresses sales, the company 
will not only have no incentive to tell the truth, it may have a legal duty to lie 
unless there is a legal compulsion to tell the truth.”). 
 75. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What Is Commercial 
Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1143, 1145 (2004) (“Factual statements by a manufacturer to consumers about 
its products with the objective of increasing sales are and should be considered 
commercial speech.”); id. at 1143 (“The issue in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky was wheth-
er the First Amendment protects a company’s making false factual statements 
about its products, likely to matter greatly to some consumers in their pur-
chasing decision, in an effort to increase sales.”); Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Are We 
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receive full constitutional protection akin to political speech, 
which would eliminate any need to define commercial speech or 
to distinguish it from political expression.76 
Nike’s speech might be characterized as employer speech of 
the sort at issue in this Article, as it presented allegedly false 
factual claims about its employees’ working conditions.77 Even 
more on point would be a scenario in which an employer alleg-
edly violates U.S. employment law with respect to its workers 
on American soil and falsely denies those allegations in a varie-
ty of communications to a range of audiences. Characterizing 
such speech as commercial or noncommercial—which in turn 
largely determines whether its truth and falsity can be regulat-
ed under current First Amendment doctrine—is complicated by 
the fact that the employer’s speech is directed to current and 
prospective workers as well as to a broad audience on a matter 
of interest to workers specifically as well as to the public more 
generally. 
Here too such speech may be accurately described as both 
political and commercial, and of both public and private con-
cern78—which again reminds us of the limits of these catego-
 
Ready for the Next Nike v. Kasky?, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 203, 219 (2014) (“It is 
irrelevant if these communications were triggered by a national debate, false 
accusations, or the company’s own desire to reach potential or actual consum-
ers. Presenting factual information about one’s own company, or its product, is 
not the act of engaging in a debate or commenting on public issues, but rather 
part of promotional communication.”). 
 76. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (“[T]here is no ‘philosophical or historical basis for asserting 
that “commercial” speech is of “lower value” than “noncommercial” speech.’” 
(quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996))); Deb-
orah J. LaFetra, Kick It up a Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commer-
cial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2004) (urging “full First 
Amendment protection for corporate speech” because of its value to listeners 
and the difficulties in parsing commercial and noncommercial speech); Martin 
H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech 
Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553 (1997) 
(same). 
 77. Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. at 656. 
 78. See Estlund, supra note 13, at 356–57 (“[I]n choosing whether to take 
or quit a job, employees are more akin to investors (of their own human capi-
tal) or consumers (of a package of ‘goods’ associated with a job). As such, they 
have a recognizable stake in information about the job that may be hidden 
from them. All the while, it is crucial to keep in mind that employees are also 
members of society and a majority of the voting citizenry. Their terms and 
conditions of employment, in the aggregate and in the staggering disparities of 
wealth and opportunities that they create, shape society and give the public a 
large stake in learning about what goes on at work.”). 
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ries.79 The next Part thus turns to theoretical and doctrinal as-
sessments of speech regulations in other contexts that largely 
eschew such categories to focus instead on the dynamics of cer-
tain speaker-listener relationships. 
II.  LISTENER-CENTERED RELATIONSHIPS AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT   
As courts and commentators struggle with questions about 
whether employer speech should be characterized as political or 
commercial, or of public or private concern, the most accurate 
answer may often be “all of the above.”80 This invites us to con-
sider instead whether we should take a speaker-centered or lis-
tener-centered approach to the protection and regulation of 
such expression. Many think of the First Amendment as safe-
guarding the interests of speakers, especially the lonely indi-
vidual speaker of conscience.81 Most First Amendment theories, 
however, do not focus exclusively on speakers’ interests and in-
stead also seek to further the interests of listeners—that is, to 
inform listeners’ search for truth and to facilitate their exercise 
of autonomy and their participation in democratic self-
governance.82 This Part describes how such a listener-centered 
focus can sometimes justify expression’s regulation as well as 
its protection to safeguard listeners’ First Amendment inter-
ests.83 
 
 79. See generally Cynthia Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: 
The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1 (1990) (discussing concerns about the Court’s content-based distinction be-
tween speech of ostensibly public and private interest); Cristina Carmody Til-
ley, Tort, Speech, and the Dubious Alchemy of State Action, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1117, 1165–66 (2015) (explaining how social media and other online speech 
platforms change the nature of the boundaries between public and private 
that govern the Court’s categorical approach). 
 80. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosure, 65 ALA. L. REV. 
1277, 1283 (2014) (“More fundamentally, though, speech really exists along a 
continuum rather than in two distinct categories. Speech designated as com-
mercial or political is often really a mixture of the two . . . .”). 
 81. See Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regula-
tion of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV 5, 14 (1989) (“It is fair to assert that 
throughout the formative period of our free speech heritage . . . the paradigm 
beneficiary of the free speech principle has been a vulnerable speaker of con-
science, impelled to speak out by the demands of humanity, yet subject to 
waves of unnecessarily harsh parochial intolerance.”). 
 82. See Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger 
Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980) (describing the positive values most 
often identified as underlying the First Amendment). 
 83. See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 7 (2013) (“It is 
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A. COMMUNICATIVE RELATIONSHIPS WHERE SPEAKERS HAVE 
NO DIGNITARY INTERESTS OF THEIR OWN 
As discussed in Part I, the Court has justified the protec-
tion as well as the content-based regulation of commercial 
speech to protect listeners’ interests in receiving accurate in-
formation that aids their decision making.84 Many thoughtful 
commentators have explained the choice to privilege consum-
ers’ interests as listeners in part on the grounds that commer-
cial speakers do not have dignitary interests of their own—that 
is, they themselves do not have expressive interests protected 
by the First Amendment.85 As Margaret M. Blair and Elizabeth 
Pollman have observed: 
[T]he Court has never based its corporate rights jurisprudence on the 
idea that a corporation is a constitutionally protected “person” in its 
own right. The Court has instead granted constitutional rights to cor-
porations to derivatively protect the rights of the natural persons that 
are assumed to be represented by the corporation, or that are inter-
acting with the corporation.86 
Arguments for adopting a listener-centered approach for 
First Amendment purposes are thus especially strong in ex-
pressive contexts lacking a dignitary speaker, as some (but not 
all) would describe the commercial setting. And although the 
protection of dignitary speakers’ choice to lie (or to decline to 
tell the truth) sometimes furthers autonomy interests protected 
by the First Amendment,87 the protection of lies or nondisclo-
 
evident that the law—especially First Amendment law—does not and cannot 
always ignore the context of speech or the institutional nature of the speaker, 
and that it does not and cannot always treat the ‘state’ as a monolithic entity. 
Again and again, courts abandon, or carve out exceptions to, the context-
insensitive rules that they so often assert are the very foundation of the rule of 
law, and certainly of the First Amendment.”); Frederick Schauer, Towards an 
Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005) (urging that 
First Amendment doctrine should turn in part on institutional context). 
 84. As Burt Neuborne observed, the Court has sometimes taken such an 
approach with respect to speech in communicative environments “that boast 
numerous hearers interested in maximizing their capacity to exercise efficient 
and autonomous choice.” Neuborne, supra note 81, at 9. 
 85. See C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 
84 IND. L.J. 981, 997 (2009) (“[C]ommercial speech is not an exercise of free-
dom by morally significant flesh-and-blood individuals to the extent that the 
speech is properly attributed to a legally constructed commercial entity.”). 
 86. Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of 
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1678 (2015).  
 87. See David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s 
Protection of Self-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 115 (2012) (finding 
First Amendment autonomy value in “knowing, factual lies about oneself that 
are intended to influence one’s public perception . . . .”). 
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sures made by speakers without such dignitary interests does 
not. A derivative understanding of these speakers’ rights thus 
permits the regulation of their statements’ truth or falsity to 
protect listeners’ interests in receiving accurate information.88 
The premise that corporate and other commercial speakers 
do not have expressive interests of their own, however, now 
faces increasing pressure.89 As just one example, the challeng-
ers in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. NLRB opposed the 
NLRB’s requirement that employers post notice of workers’ 
NLRA rights by relying on compelled-speech precedent that in-
volved individual human speakers with clear dignitary inter-
ests of their own90—and the D.C. Circuit similarly relied on 
those cases in striking down the NLRB’s rule as a violation of 
employers’ free speech rights.91 These decisions included West 
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (where the Court 
struck down a school board’s requirement that students salute 
the flag)92 and Wooley v. Maynard (where the Court invalidated 
New Hampshire’s requirement that the state’s motorists dis-
play its motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates).93 Nei-
ther the challengers nor the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the 
 
 88. See BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC 119 (2015) (“First Amend-
ment doctrine should recognize that hearers as well as speakers are entitled to 
be treated with dignity.”). 
 89. See id. at 117 (“Despite its hearer-borrowed nature, the [Court’s con-
temporary] corporate speech doctrine is relentlessly speaker centered, with 
not a hint of concern for the interests of hearers except as a rhetorical flourish 
designed to further enable privileged speakers.”); Piety, supra note 17, at 5 
(“Sorrell completes what has been a decades-long process of turning the ra-
tionale for commercial speech doctrine upside down by putting the speaker, 
rather than the public interest, at the center of the analysis. It completes what 
I call has been a ‘bait-and-switch’ whereby the protection for commercial 
speech was offered under one justification, but once it was granted, has mor-
phed into something completely different.”); Rodney A. Smolla, Free the For-
tune 500! The Debate over Corporate Speech and the First Amendment, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1277, 1295–96 (2004) (noting a paradigm shift in which 
the focus of the Court’s commercial speech doctrine “has moved from consumer 
protection to speaker protection”); G. Edward White, The Evolution of First 
Amendment Protection for Compelled Commercial Speech, 29 J.L. & POL. 481, 
496–98 (2014) (“A majority of Justices no longer believe that the sole First 
Amendment dimension of commercial speech cases is the social interest in the 
circulation of information about commercial products.”). 
 90. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 91. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 956–58 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (discussing precedent and concluding that “these, and other such cases, 
may [not] be distinguished from this one on the Board’s terms”). 
 92. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 93. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
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schoolchildren and motorists in those cases held autonomy and 
self-expression interests quite distinguishable from those of 
most corporate and other commercial entities.94 
Moreover, even those who are generally skeptical about 
commercial speakers’ expressive interests still sometimes iden-
tify certain corporate speakers—including, but not limited to, 
nonprofit corporations—as having comparatively strong ex-
pressive claims in their own right.95 The Supreme Court’s re-
cent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. offers a re-
lated illustration, interpreting the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act’s statutory protection of “persons’” religious ex-
ercise to include at least some family-owned and closely held 
corporations.96 As the next Section explains, however, speakers’ 
claims to expressive interests of their own do not always doom 
the case for treating their listeners’ interests as paramount for 
First Amendment purposes. 
B. COMMUNICATIVE RELATIONSHIPS THAT INVOLVE 
IMBALANCES OF INFORMATION OR POWER 
Although dignitary speakers may have autonomy interests 
in deciding what they will and will not say—for example, in ut-
tering falsehoods or resisting truthful disclosures—listeners 
themselves have autonomy, enlightenment, and democratic 
self-governance interests in receiving accurate information that 
empowers their decision making. We may thus still choose to 
 
 94. See Kendrick, supra note 17, at 1204 (“A court could, in short, easily 
distinguish the Notice Posting Rule from the Pledge of Allegiance. But the 
D.C. Circuit did not. It is this fact that makes National [Ass’n] of Manufactur-
ers so indicative of current trends in First Amendment law.”). 
 95. See, e.g., SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, 
MORALITY, AND THE LAW 101 (2014) (recognizing the complex cases of nonprof-
it corporations, the press, and other market actors). 
 96. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774, 2785 
(2014); see also Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Speech & the Rights of Others, 30 
CONST. COMMENT. 335, 340 (2015) (suggesting that the Court’s statutory rea-
soning in Hobby Lobby “would seem to apply” to corporations’ free exercise 
claims as well). For contrasting normative views, see Caroline Mala Corbin, 
Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 277 (2015) (arguing that 
corporations do not have protected religious exercise rights); Kent Greenfield, 
In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 321 (2015) (“Of 
course corporations are not genuine human beings and should not automati-
cally receive all the constitutional rights that human beings claim. At the 
same time, . . . it is similarly obvious that corporations should be able to claim 
some constitutional rights. So which ones, and when?”); Jason Iuliano, Do 
Corporations Have Religious Beliefs?, 90 IND. L.J. 47 (2015) (arguing that cor-
porations have protected religious exercise rights). 
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privilege comparatively disadvantaged listeners over compara-
tively advantaged speakers when their First Amendment inter-
ests collide.97 More specifically, even in relationships where the 
presence of a dignitary speaker is uncontested, theory and doc-
trine sometimes support a listener-based approach to First 
Amendment analysis when those relationships involve asym-
metries of information or other forms of power. 
Daniel Halberstam is among those to have described such 
a relationship-specific approach to First Amendment analysis: 
Substantively, the view that the speaker and listener occupy deter-
mined social roles with respect to their discourse leads to a focus on 
the protection of the specific communicative relationship as opposed 
to a general prohibition of all content-based regulation. With regard 
to these communications, such as discussions between professional 
and client, government regulation is not invariably destructive of 
communicative interests, but may indeed foster the communicative 
relationship and assist in institutionalizing the bounded discourse. 
Content-based government regulation that assists in maintaining the 
boundaries of the discourse is therefore permissible, although similar 
regulation would not be allowed absent the special relationship be-
tween the speaker and listener.98 
Relatedly, Seana Shiffrin has explored in detail “features of 
the moral and epistemic environment” of certain communica-
tive relationships that should trigger heightened expectations 
of speakers’ sincerity and accuracy.99 As one example, she offers 
 
 97. See Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Re-
sponsibility in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 170 (1997) (“A system of free expression based on Kant-
ian autonomy, however, would not merely concern itself with protection 
against government suppression. Because the State’s purpose is to preserve 
the dignity of its citizens, such a system would also ensure that citizens use 
speech consistently with autonomy. The State can and should regulate speech 
that, by attempting to override the thought processes of other individuals, dis-
respects their rational capacities.”). 
 98. Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the 
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 869 (1999); 
see also id. at 834 (“In other words, whether the relationships are ones of 
trust, such as those between lawyer and client or doctor and patient, or are 
merely common material enterprises, such as those between buyers and 
sellers, their presence triggers a contextual First Amendment review that is 
specifically centered around the social relation, as opposed to an abstract re-
view such as that traditionally applied to the street-corner speaker.”). 
 99. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Deceptive Advertising and Taking Responsi-
bility for Others 33 (UCLA Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper Se-
ries, Research Paper No. 15-28, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2658450; see also id. at 15 (“[T]he moral wrong of deception 
is better understood in terms of the failure to exercise due care to ensure one 
does not impart or reinforce inaccurate beliefs in another.”). 
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a relationship-centered explanation as to why the regulation of 
lies by those with expert information should not offend the 
First Amendment: 
Regulating lies by experts about the contents of their actual, certified, 
or claimed expertise does not single out content. Rather, it attaches to 
a feature of the speaker and the relationship between the speaker and 
the utterance. This relationship is singled out as meriting regulation 
for content-independent reasons, namely that listeners should be able 
to rely upon the sincerity of experts because they have or claim spe-
cial access to information that listeners either do not have, or reason-
ably should not be expected to cultivate on their own.100 
A focus on the “epistemic” features of communicative rela-
tionships emphasizes information asymmetries between speak-
ers and listeners.101 Indeed, a great deal of contract and com-
mercial law attends to these differentials between transactional 
partners.102 For example, regardless of whether commercial 
speakers have dignitary interests of their own, consumers as 
listeners have strong informational interests in accurate com-
mercial speech that furthers their own exercise of autonomy. 
For these reasons, Leslie Gielow Jacobs characterizes transac-
tional communications more broadly as regulable in order to in-
form and further parties’ decision making by correcting infor-
mational asymmetries.103 
 
 100. SHIFFRIN, supra note 95, at 132. 
 101. See JASON STANLEY, HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS 145 (2015) (“One can 
command someone to believe something, by presenting oneself as an epistemic 
authority, whose expert testimony is sufficient to back up one’s practical com-
mand.”). 
 102. Moreover, as Professor Shiffrin explains, “Not only does a consumer 
face practical barriers to gaining full information about the foods they consid-
er, it is further unavailable to her (and her representatives) as a matter of le-
gal right.” Shiffrin, supra note 99, at 26; see also id. at 27 (“[W]hen we grant a 
monopoly, whether partial or total, to one party over information relevant to 
both parties, over which both parties have entitlements and/or strong moral 
interests, the party with exclusive access should bear a higher level of respon-
sibility for ensuring that communications concerning this information are suc-
cessful in imparting accurate uptake.”). 
 103. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Compelled Commercial Speech as Compelled 
Consent Speech, 29 J.L. & POL. 517, 522 (2014) (“This government regulatory 
power to require the disclosure of facts material to informed consent is not 
limited to commercial contracts. Consent is a crucial element that renders 
many types of transactions legal and enforceable. Governments have always 
had the authority to define the facts that must be communicated and the cir-
cumstances that must exist to create this critical element of consent.”). 
As Rebecca Tushnet observes, market efficiency offers a related justifica-
tion for privileging listeners’ interests in transactional contexts. Tushnet, su-
pra note 17, at 37 (“Compelled commercial disclosures are a form of regulation 
of information where deception may not be the regulator’s primary concern. 
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Theory and doctrine sometimes privilege listeners’ First 
Amendment interests in noncommercial contexts as well, by 
requiring even dignitary speakers to address information 
asymmetries through compelled disclosures. For example, alt-
hough a five-to-four Court in Citizens United v. FEC struck 
down federal restrictions on corporate speakers’ independent 
campaign expenditures,104 an eight-to-one majority upheld fed-
eral law requiring that political speakers disclose themselves 
as the source of certain campaign communications to further 
listeners’ interests: “The First Amendment protects political 
speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to re-
act to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This 
transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions 
and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”105 
More generally, the Court has upheld a variety of statutes re-
quiring individual political speakers to disclose their identi-
ties—for example, as petition signatories or as sources of cer-
tain campaign contributions—for the public’s benefit as 
listeners.106 In this manner, the Court has permitted govern-
ment to require even political speakers with clear dignitary in-
terests of their own to tell the truth about certain matters to 
facilitate their listeners’ First Amendment interests.107 
Although speaker-listener information asymmetries alone 
sometimes justify regulation to protect listeners’ interests, as 
we have seen, the case for such regulation becomes even 
 
Instead, the concern is for the available mix of truthful information—a key 
part of the structure of a market, because well-functioning markets require 
lots of information.”); see also Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in 
the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 449, 451 (2012) (“Deceptive behavior is a 
costly activity that aims primarily at the redistribution rather than the pro-
duction of value and often causes poor decision making.”). 
 104. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
 105. Id. at 371. 
 106. E.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2819 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976), superseded by statute on other grounds, Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in 
McConnell v. FEC, 510 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 107. The contemporary Court remains deeply divided on these issues. See 
NEUBORNE, supra note 88, at 11 (“In settings where the deregulatory First 
Amendment allows the speech process to be dominated by the strong to the 
detriment of the weak, the Court often splits 5-4 over the constitutionality of 
efforts to restrain overly powerful speakers, enhance weak ones, and protect 
vulnerable hearers.”). Relatedly, the Court has increasingly resisted—in re-
cent years—legislative efforts to restrict the volume of speech by comparative-
ly wealthy speakers. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (striking down 
limits on corporate expenditures on independent campaign communications). 
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stronger when accompanied by power differentials.108 This can 
be the case, for example, when listeners occupy a position of 
relative dependence or vulnerability with respect to speakers. 
Professionals’ and other fiduciaries’ speech to their clients and 
beneficiaries occurs within such a relationship where listeners 
trust speakers for important advice and guidance. As Paul 
Horwitz explains, professional speech is both protected and 
regulated because it rests on “expertise based on a body of spe-
cialized knowledge” designed to further listeners’ autonomy by 
informing and advising their choices, often in high-stakes situ-
ations.109 The relationship is thus one where professionals’ 
speech may be regulated to protect listeners by prohibiting lies 
and misrepresentations, as well as requiring truthful disclo-
sures of listeners’ options and risks—even though doctors, law-
yers, and other expert speakers of course possess dignitary in-
terests of their own.110 A number of thoughtful commentators 
 
 108. In a related context, Yochai Benkler characterized the distinction be-
tween privacy and transparency as turning on “a theory of asymmetric power”: 
The core of the argument is that privacy is at risk when there are 
powerful observers and vulnerable subjects. Transparency, by con-
trast, involves disclosure of information about powerful parties that 
weaker parties can use to check that power or its abuse. When we say 
that an act of information disclosure “threatens privacy” or “promises 
transparency,” we are making a judgment about who has power and 
who is susceptible to it and how that power ought to be limited. 
Yochai Benkler, The Real Significance of Wikileaks, AM. PROSPECT, May 2011, 
at 31, 33. 
 109. HORWITZ, supra note 83, at 248–50; see also id. at 250 (“It is a fiduci-
ary relationship: the patient, owing to the inequality of knowledge between 
him and the dentist, is entitled to expect competent professional advice, not 
just the dentist’s personal opinion. Dentists offering advice to patients, in 
short, are supposed to provide the best views of the profession. They may be 
free to offer dissenting views outside that context—indeed, if professional 
knowledge is to advance, professionals must be able to challenge the bounda-
ries of received professional opinion—but they are constrained in what they 
can say within the fiduciary relationship.”); Robert Post, Informed Consent to 
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 972 (2007) (“Informed consent doctrine mandates the 
communication of medical knowledge to the end that a lay patient can receive 
the expert information necessary to make an autonomous, intelligent and ac-
curate selection of what medical treatment to receive.”). 
 110. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43-214 (2015) (requiring psychothera-
pists to disclose their credentials, available grievance procedures, therapeutic 
methods, duration of therapy, confidentiality rules, and more); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“A lawyer shall not 
knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact of law to a tribunal . . . .”); id. 
r. 4.1(a) (“In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly 
. . . make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.”); id. 
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have made related observations in the information technology 
context, where government regulation may help address tech-
nology users’ vulnerability to those with whom they entrust 
important information or upon whose judgment they rely.111 
Relationships in which speakers have the ability to coerce 
or otherwise control their listeners (even absent some special 
relationship of trust) also involve asymmetries of power that 
may justify regulation to protect listeners’ interests. As an il-
lustration, consider situations in which speakers hold their lis-
teners “captive” in some respects, as the First Amendment 
“permits the government to prohibit offensive speech when the 
‘captive’ audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech.”112 The 
Court has suggested in related contexts that women seeking 
abortions at health care facilities can be considered “‘captive’ by 
medical circumstance” (that is, with limited possibilities for ex-
it or rebuttal), which increases the coercive effect of speech tar-
geted to them.113 In short, listener-centered relationships in-
clude not only those in which listeners have less access to key 
information than speakers, but also those in which listeners 
are dependent on or vulnerable to comparatively powerful 
speakers in various ways. 
 
r. 8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First 
Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1186 (2016) (“Because of their spe-
cial power over others and their special relationship to others, information fi-
duciaries have special duties to act in ways that do not harm the interests of 
the people whose information they collect, analyze, use, sell, and distrib-
ute. . . . And because of their different position, the First Amendment permits 
somewhat greater regulation of information fiduciaries than it does for other 
people and entities.”); James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 868, 903–04 (2014) (describing the “inescapable information asymmetry 
between users and search engines” that should be understood to trigger duties 
of loyalty and care). 
 112. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988). 
 113. Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) 
(“[W]hile targeted picketing of the home threatens the psychological well-being 
of the ‘captive’ resident, targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not 
only the psychological, but also the physical, well-being of the patient held 
‘captive’ by medical circumstance.”). For related discussion, see Caroline Mala 
Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 939, 941 (2009); Nadia N. Sawicki, Compelling Images: The Constitution-
ality of Emotionally Persuasive Health Campaigns, 73 MD. L. REV. 458, 506–
20 (2014). 
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III.  A LISTENER-BASED APPROACH TO EMPLOYERS’ 
TRUTH AND LIES   
This Part proposes a First Amendment theory of employer 
speech that turns not on a determination of whether employer 
speech about workers’ rights and other working conditions is 
political or commercial—or of public or private concern—but 
instead on its occurrence within a listener-centered relation-
ship. In so doing, this Part urges that a focus on the nature of 
the employment relationship better and more coherently fur-
thers key First Amendment values than does a myopic focus on 
whether the contested speech fits within existing and often un-
satisfactory constitutional categories. This Part then explores 
the doctrinal implications of this approach more specifically for 
the regulation of truth and lies in and about the workplace. 
A. EMPLOYER SPEECH AS OCCURRING IN A LISTENER-CENTERED 
RELATIONSHIP 
Whether the employment relationship is one that justifies 
the regulation of employers’ truth and lies to inform and em-
power listeners’ decision making turns in great part on how one 
characterizes the flow of information and power within that re-
lationship.114 As examples, we might characterize the employ-
ment relationship as one between arms-length parties to a 
commercial transaction, between unequal parties in a hierar-
chical system, between fiduciaries and beneficiaries in a rela-
tionship of trust, between competing participants in public poli-
cy debates, or perhaps something else altogether. This Section 
asserts that the workplace relationship involves both infor-
mation and power asymmetries that justify its characterization 
as listener-centered, and thus proposes that employers as 
speakers have heightened responsibilities of accuracy and sin-
cerity when they address workers’ rights and other working 
conditions.115 
 
 114. I am persuaded by those who argue that corporations’ free speech 
rights are best understood as derivative of their listeners’, and thus both pro-
tected and regulable to protect those listeners’ interests. See supra notes 84–
87 and accompanying text. Because I have little to add to the many commen-
tators who have thoughtfully explored this issue—and because I recognize 
that some employers are not corporations—here I focus instead on whether 
employer speech can be regulated to protect listeners’ interests even if some 
employers are dignitary speakers in their own right, and thus have claims to 
expressive interests themselves. 
 115. The employment relationship is an especially strong candidate for 
characterization as listener-centered because it involves asymmetries of power 
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First, the employment relationship is a transactional rela-
tionship riddled with information asymmetries.116 Employers 
know considerably more than workers about the terms and 
conditions of employment, about industry and economic projec-
tions, and—as repeat players with greater resources—about 
applicable law. As Joseph Mastrosimone, among others, has ob-
served, “The employer holds all of the information in such cas-
es. It is the employer that knows the true state of the industry 
 
as well as of information. In future work, I hope to explore in greater detail 
whether and when asymmetries of information or power by themselves suffice 
to justify a listener-centered approach to the regulation of speech in other 
communicative relationships. 
 116. Employer speech on workers’ rights and other working conditions can 
also be characterized as key to commercial transactions, with workers akin to 
consumers. Indeed, all employers are commercial actors in that they buy the 
labor of their workers (and may buy or sell other goods and services as well), 
even if their reason for existence is noncommercial—as is true, for example, of 
many nonprofit employers. To be sure, a purely transactional view of employer 
speech that involves only asymmetries of information would appropriately 
constrain the speech of all parties to these transactions, including that of the 
workers themselves. Indeed, workers’ speech is already controlled for falsity 
by the at-will employment regime (in which workers are subject to termination 
for any reason), by contract in certain contexts (where collective bargaining 
agreements and fixed-term contracts permit termination for “just cause”), and 
by statute in a number of jurisdictions. E.g., IOWA CODE § 715A.6A (2016) 
(prohibiting knowingly false claims of certain academic degrees to secure em-
ployment or certain other benefits); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-112 (2014) 
(same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 532 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (prohib-
iting fraudulent misrepresentations); see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. 
Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the First Amend-
ment does not protect applicants’ lies to “secure moneys or other valuable con-
siderations, say offers of employment . . . .”); Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, 
High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
1435, 1454–66, 1490 (2015) (distinguishing “high value” lies by reporters or 
investigators to uncover wrongdoing from employees’ damaging lies to and 
about their employers). Employees who act as their employers’ agents also 
bear fiduciary responsibilities to their employer principals that include duties 
of candor and disclosure. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“The elements of common-law agency are present in the 
relationships between employer and employee, corporation and officer, client 
and lawyer, and partnership and general partner.”); id. § 8.11 (“An agent has 
a duty to use reasonable effort to provide the principal with facts that the 
agent knows, has reason to know, or should know when . . . subject to any 
manifestation by the principal, the agent knows or has reason to know that 
the principal would wish to have the facts or the facts are material to the 
agent’s duties to the principal . . . .”). Unions’ speech is already heavily regu-
lated as well. As just one example, the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act requires unions to make numerous disclosures about dues, fees, 
finances, potential conflicts of interest, and organizational structure. 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 431–432 (2012). 
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and the true state of the company’s financial viability.”117 
Workers’ First Amendment interests as listeners in truthful 
employer speech on these topics thus justify the protection as 
well as the regulation of this speech to address their informa-
tional disadvantage. Such regulation furthers efficiency inter-
ests as well. As Kent Greenfield explains, “Lack of accurate in-
formation about job security (or, for that matter, about any 
other employment condition valued by employees) will cause 
workers to allocate their labor to inefficient uses and will force 
employers offering secure employment to pay more in wages 
than they would need to if workers had correct information.”118 
To be sure, a listener-centered view would support the pro-
tection as well as the regulation of employer speech, as a great 
deal of employer speech on such topics can valuably inform 
workers’ decisions about whether to take or leave a job, wheth-
er to join or reject a union, or whether to engage in protected 
activity.119 For this reason, I do not advocate the regulation of a 
wider swath of truthful and noncoercive employer speech, such 
 
 117. Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Limiting Information in the Information Age: 
The NLRB’s Misguided Attempt To Squelch Employer Speech, 52 WASHBURN 
L.J. 473, 512 (2013); see also Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for Work-
place Transparency to Information About Pay, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 781, 781 
(2014) (“[M]uch of the employment-related information that would be valuable 
to individuals and the public is not readily available to outsiders to an organi-
zation, or even to insiders.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law 
of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 209 (2001) (“[I]t is not clear that most workers 
have the information that would equip them to engage in appropriate bargain-
ing . . . .”). 
 118. Greenfield, supra note 1, at 744–45; see also id. at 788 (“The labor 
market, like the capital market, depends on the free flow of information to en-
sure allocational efficiency. Fraud regulation, in fact, may be more important 
in the labor market because workers cannot easily minimize the risk of fraud 
through diversification. Moreover, there are fewer incentives for private moni-
toring to take the place of government regulation.”). 
 119. See Paul Barron, A Theory of Protected Employer Rights: A Revisionist 
Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the National Labor Relations 
Act, 59 TEX. L. REV. 421, 468 (1981) (“Because normally only the employer is 
in a position to inform employees of potential drawbacks to unionization, the 
law must permit a certain amount of employer speech in order to ensure an 
informed electorate. If the employer’s speech is merely informational—that is, 
conveys clearly provable facts—it will not interfere with employee rights in 
any event.”); Cox, supra note 29, at 15 (noting informational value of employ-
ers’ speech to answer attacks or charges, or to share sincerely held opinions); 
Joseph K. Pokempner, Employer Free Speech Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 25 MD. L. REV. 111, 146–47 (1965) (“Since both are likely to prosper 
or suffer together, it is only fair that an employer be given the opportunity to 
express to his employees his view on the impact of unionization on the success 
of the business.”). 
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as sincere and accurate employer speech on controversial topics 
or employer speech that involves expression of opinion rather 
than fact.120 As discussed below, however, I agree that attention 
to the power differentials between employers and workers can 
help us recognize a broader swath of employer speech as im-
permissibly coercive and thus unprotected by the First 
Amendment.121 
Second, arguments for a listener-based approach to em-
ployer speech gain even more force once we understand the 
communicative relationship between employers and workers as 
involving something other than an arms-length transaction be-
tween equals.122 Indeed, in addition to experiencing disad-
vantage in terms of information (itself a form of power),123 
workers also confront economic and expressive inequalities that 
limit traditional remedies of exit and counterspeech. 
 
 120. For other views, see Becker, supra note 36, at 500 (urging that em-
ployers have no legal interest in union representation elections and thus that 
their antiunion speech should be subject to greater regulation more generally); 
Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First 
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 361–62 (1995) (“The abstract 
‘right’ of [employer] free speech becomes, within the particular context of the 
workplace and its existing structure of rights and privileges, the right to con-
trol and dominate.”). 
 121. See infra notes 169–76 and accompanying text. 
 122. See RICHARD EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE WORKPLACE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 12 (1979) (“Conflict exists 
because the interests of workers and those of employers collide, and what is 
good for one is frequently costly for the other. Control is rendered problematic 
because, unlike the other commodities involved in production, labor power is 
always embodied in people, who have their own interests and needs and who 
retain their power to resist being treated like a commodity.”); id. at 13 (“The 
workplace becomes a battleground, as employers attempt to extract the maxi-
mum effort from workers and workers necessarily resist their bosses’ imposi-
tions.”). 
 123. See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 
19 (1978) (“To the extent that knowledge gives power, to that extent do lies 
affect the distribution of power; they add to that of the liar, and diminish that 
of the deceived, altering his choices at different levels.”); Estlund, supra note 
13, at 372 (“[I]nformation asymmetries confer a bargaining advantage on the 
more informed party. Workers who lack material information about jobs—both 
the job that is under negotiation and possible alternative jobs—are at a bar-
gaining disadvantage.”); see also Charlotte S. Alexander, Workplace Infor-
mation-Forcing: Constitutionality and Effectiveness, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 487, 527 
(2016) (“Workplace information-forcing seeks to equalize not only an infor-
mation asymmetry but also, in some sense, the power asymmetry that is in-
herent in employment relationships by forcing a transfer of knowledge be-
tween the parties.” (footnote omitted)). 
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More specifically, employers’ economic power includes their 
power over workers’ livelihoods. As we have seen, the Supreme 
Court emphasized workers’ economic dependence on their em-
ployers when characterizing an employer’s false threats that 
employees would lose their jobs if they voted to unionize as “a 
threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, 
and as such without the protection of the First Amendment.”124 
Harassment law relatedly considers the power dynamics of the 
workplace by treating employers’ quid pro quo requests or de-
mands for sexual favors as unprotected speech that coerces its 
listeners by forcing them to a choice between submission and 
adverse job consequences.125 That employers at times have the 
power to control workers’ physical liberty—e.g., by compelling 
workers’ attendance at “captive audience” meetings—further 
illustrates how this communicative relationship differs from 
most others in its coercive potential.126 
 
 124. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969); see also Thom-
as v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537–38 (1945) (“When to this persuasion other 
things are added which bring about coercion, or give it that character, the lim-
it of [First Amendment protections] has been passed.”); id. at 543–44 (Douglas, 
J., concurring) (“[O]nce [someone] uses the economic power which he has over 
other men and their jobs to influence their action, he is doing more than exer-
cising the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 125. E.g., Nadine Strossen, The Tensions Between Regulating Workplace 
Harassment and the First Amendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701, 
704 (1995) (“Even the most diehard free speech absolutist recognizes that the 
speech involved in quid pro quo harassment is tantamount to threats or extor-
tion, expression that has long been punishable without raising substantial free 
speech concerns in any context.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1800 (1992) (“[Q]uid pro quo 
harassment[, even if it involves speech,] would seemingly be as unprotected by 
the First Amendment as any other form of threat or extortion.”). Courts have 
thus treated employers’ harassing speech as akin to coercive conduct unpro-
tected by the First Amendment. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 
(1993) (“Title VII [is] an example of a permissible content-neutral regulation of 
conduct.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (“[S]ince words 
can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but 
against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the 
enemy the Nation’s defense secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of 
a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of 
a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for example, sexually 
derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among other words, may produce a violation of Ti-
tle VII’s general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment 
practices.” (citations omitted)). 
 126. See Paul M. Secunda, Addressing Political Captive Audience Work-
place Meetings in the Post-Citizens United Environment, 120 YALE L.J. FORUM 
17, 19–22 (2010), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/addressing-political 
-captive-audience-workplace-meetings-in-the-post-citizens-united-environment 
(explaining how employers may compel worker attendance at such meetings 
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Workers experience expressive as well as economic ine-
quality, further distinguishing workplace relationships from 
those involving the free-flowing exchange of ideas and mean-
ingful opportunities for counterspeech. As Cynthia Estlund ex-
plains, “Particularly in the private sector, employers enjoy 
nearly untrammeled power to censor and punish the speech of 
their employees, subject only to a variety of limited statutory 
and common law restrictions . . . .”127 In other words, the work-
place is not a free speech zone: workers experience asymme-
tries of information and power such that their speech is neither 
fully informed nor fully free.128 Workplace relationships thus 
involve both the moral as well as the epistemic features that 
Seana Shiffrin identifies as key to triggering heightened expec-
tations of comparatively powerful speakers’ sincerity and accu-
racy.129 
 
by threatening their jobs or by punishing counterspeech). 
 127. Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the 
Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 689 (1997); see 
also ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, WHO OWNS YOUR POLITICS? THE 
EMERGENCE OF EMPLOYEE MOBILIZATION AS A SOURCE OF CORPORATE POLIT-
ICAL INFLUENCE 2 (2015) (documenting ways in which employers exploit 
workers’ economic dependence to coerce workers’ political behavior); Jeffrey M. 
Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the 
Regulation of Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091, 1093 
(2011) (“Among the most serious . . . collective-action problems are restrictions 
on employee discourse, particularly the restrictions on employees’ ability to 
access and discuss relevant information.”). 
 128. Workers’ relative dependence and vulnerability lead some to urge that 
employers should even be understood to have fiduciary responsibilities to-
wards their employees, which would further support the regulation of employ-
ers’ truth and lies to prevent exploitation within a relationship of trust and 
vulnerability. See Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (“Employees share many of the characteristics of 
beneficiaries in fiduciary relationships: the employer exercises discretion in 
the management of the firm, employees are vulnerable to the use of that dis-
cretion and the potential for opportunism, and employees must incur agency 
costs in managing their relationship with the employer.”); Marleen A. 
O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a 
Fiduciary Duty To Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1194 
(1991) (“[A] stakeholder model of corporate social responsibility . . . recognizes 
that employees have legitimate noncontractual claims against the corpora-
tion.”); see also RICHARD A. BALES ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 
215 (2007) (explaining that “ERISA places fiduciary duties on [employers (and 
others)] who use their discretion to administer and manage employee benefit 
plans [on behalf of employees and other plan beneficiaries]”).  
 129. To the extent that unions enjoy the same information and power ad-
vantages over workers as do employers, the same analysis would apply to un-
ions’ speech on workers’ rights and working conditions—and, indeed, unions’ 
speech is already heavily regulated. See supra note 116. But, as Craig Becker 
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To be sure, some take a very different view, describing the 
workplace as just another forum for the marketplace of ideas. 
Such an approach, for example, equates union representation 
elections with political campaigns in which speech is largely 
unregulated.130 The NLRB itself has sometimes relied on these 
analogies in justifying its hands-off approach to most lies in 
this setting.131 But such parallels fail to acknowledge the infor-
mation and power differentials in the employer speech context 
that differ markedly from those in purely political settings.132 
For these reasons the Court rejected this metaphor in NLRB v. 
Gissel Packing Co.: 
Stating these obvious principles is but another way of recognizing 
that what is basically at stake is the establishment of a nonperma-
nent, limited relationship between the employer, his economically de-
pendent employee and his union agent, not the election of legislators 
or the enactment of legislation whereby that relationship is ultimate-
ly defined and where the independent voter may be freer to listen 
more objectively and employers as a class freer to talk.133 
Political analogies also fail because employers in union 
representation elections “are not competing against unions in a 
neutral election, but rather are attempting to influence an elec-
 
explains, unions in many respects do not hold the same coercive power over 
workers as employers do. See Becker, supra note 36, at 582 (“[N]one of the co-
ercive practices routinely ascribed to unions—enforcing a closed shop, extract-
ing compulsory dues, forcing employees to strike—have ever been lawful ab-
sent employer consent and most are now unlawful even with employer 
consent. Only by gaining a share of employers’ economic authority can unions 
gain any coercive power in the workplace. A majority vote for representation 
affords the union no authority to set the terms of employment, yielding it only 
a right to negotiate about wages, hours, and working conditions, and placing 
the employer under no obligation to reach agreement with the union.” (foot-
notes omitted)). 
 130. See Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representa-
tion Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 68 
(1964) (“[R]epresentation elections are closely akin to political contests.”); 
Mastrosimone, supra note 117, at 475 (“[O]ne of the central features of Ameri-
can labor law[] [is] the approximation of the democratic process through the 
union representation campaign. Akin to a political election, the representation 
election provides a limited, but an important, period of time during which the 
union, employer, and employees can engage in protected, lawful speech to per-
suade the employees how to vote in the election.” (footnote omitted)). 
 131. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
 132. See Becker, supra note 36, at 497 (“This conception . . . subvert[s] la-
bor’s right to representation, for it rests on a fiction of equality between unions 
and employers as candidates vying in the electoral arena. . . . [L]awmakers 
have elaborated the political model into a web of union election rules that ob-
scures inequality in the workplace.”). 
 133. 395 U.S. 575, 617–18 (1969). 
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tion in an arena where they hold ultimate power.”134 As dis-
cussed above, employers are free not only to require workers to 
attend captive audience meetings involving antiunion speech at 
the workplace, but also to deny unions’ access to employees.135 
In short, the information and power dynamics of workplace re-
lationships are vastly different from those in the political are-
na. 
B. THE DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF A LISTENER-BASED 
APPROACH TO EMPLOYER SPEECH 
The preceding Section asserted that employers’ speech 
about workers’ rights and other working conditions occurs 
within a relationship that should be understood as listener-
centered for First Amendment purposes. This Section examines 
the doctrinal consequences of this assessment for the regula-
tion of employers’ truth and lies. 
1. Requiring Employers’ Truthful Disclosures 
As a doctrinal matter, a listener-centered focus can inform 
our choice of the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to 
government requirements that comparatively knowledgeable or 
powerful speakers make truthful disclosures of fact or law for 
listeners’ benefit.136 For example, a listener-centered focus sug-
gests that government requirements of truthful disclosures to 
inform and empower listeners in those relationships should re-
ceive deference in the form of rational-basis scrutiny—the 
standard that the Supreme Court has applied to compelled 
commercial disclosures when necessary to address commercial 
speakers’ deception, and that many lower courts apply to com-
pelled commercial disclosures that seek to inform and empower 
consumers even absent a history of deception by the regulated 
speakers.137 
 
 134. Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representa-
tion, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008); see also Becker, supra note 36, at 523–47. 
 135. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Helen Norton, Secrets, Lies, and Disclosure, 27 J.L. & POL. 641, 
642 (2012) (describing how a listener-based focus may affect disclosure law 
doctrine). 
 137. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. The Court applies “exacting 
scrutiny” to disclosure requirements in the campaign speech context, which 
requires that the required disclosure be substantially related to a sufficiently 
important government interest. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310, 366 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976). Disclosure require-
ments may be less likely to survive this scrutiny when applied to less powerful 
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A listener-centered focus can also inform our analysis 
whether a contested disclosure requirement survives the rele-
vant level of scrutiny. For example, regardless of the level of 
scrutiny applied, courts considering challenges to disclosure re-
quirements in other contexts generally assess the government’s 
motive in seeking disclosure as well as balance the disclosure’s 
expressive costs against its benefits in informing listeners’ de-
cision making.138 This approach recognizes that the government 
often (but not always) has good reason for seeking disclosures 
that inform and empower listeners, and also that different dis-
closure requirements may vary considerably in their potential 
to chill protected expression.139 This approach supports re-
quirements that comparatively knowledgeable and powerful 
speakers make truthful disclosures not only of important in-
formation to which they have unique (and perhaps exclusive) 
access, but also important information that the speakers are in 
the best position to communicate even though they might oth-
erwise be loath to disclose for self-interested reasons. Think, for 
instance, of requirements that cigarette manufacturers post 
government health warnings on cigarette packages and adver-
tisements where smokers are most likely to see them, as tobac-
co manufacturers are uniquely well positioned to disseminate 
this important message—but unlikely to do so voluntarily. 
 
speakers. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (strik-
ing down Ohio’s disclaimer requirement as applied to a single individual circu-
lating hand-produced political literature). 
 138. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 524–25 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(explaining that courts considering First Amendment challenges to compelled 
disclosures should first assess the adequacy of the government’s interest, and 
then evaluate the disclosure’s effectiveness in achieving that interest); Leslie 
Kendrick, Disclosure and Its Discontents, 27 J.L. & POL. 575, 577 (2012) 
(“[D]isclosure law is about both categorization and balancing, both purpose 
and effects.”); id. at 587 (“Given that disclosure may at once provide listeners 
(and would-be speakers) with useful information and deter other would-be 
speakers (and thus deprive listeners of other viewpoints), determining the ef-
fect of a law upon autonomy may require a type of balancing.”). 
 139. Kendrick, supra note 138, at 586 (“There are enough legitimate rea-
sons for the government to legislate disclosure that it would be improper to 
draw an inference of discrimination from the fact of a disclosure requirement. 
First, information is necessary to governance, particularly so in a regulatory 
state. The government may legitimately seek disclosures to ensure the func-
tioning not just of its campaign finance system but also of its securities laws, 
its prescription drug approval process, and any number of other regulatory 
undertakings. . . . Second, in contrast with most restrictions on speech, com-
pelled disclosure may itself serve First Amendment values.”). 
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For example, disclosures of the sort proposed by the NLRB 
with respect to workers’ NLRA rights140—as well as various dis-
closure requirements enacted by Congress and many state leg-
islatures with respect to workers’ rights under other employ-
ment laws141—offer significant listener-centered benefits by 
addressing workers’ lack of knowledge about available work-
place protections. Many workers simply do not know their legal 
rights: as one illustration, a study by Charlotte Alexander and 
Arthi Prasad found that fifty-nine percent of workers surveyed 
had inaccurate substantive knowledge of their rights under 
wage and hour law and seventy-seven percent had inaccurate 
procedural legal knowledge—that is, they did not know where 
to file a wage and hour complaint.142 Alexander and Prasad fur-
ther found that “the least politically, economically, and socially 
powerful and secure workers were the . . . least likely to have 
accurate substantive and procedural legal knowledge.”143 For 
these reasons, Jeffrey Hirsch suggests that “the lack of 
knowledge appears so severe that it may effectively eliminate 
those rights for most workers.”144 Amanda Ireland relatedly 
fears that workers’ ignorance of the law in some areas may be 
growing; she attributes worker ignorance about NLRA rights to 
declining unionization rates and increasing numbers of immi-
grants and young workers who may be especially unfamiliar 
with their legal rights.145 Requiring that employers post notice 
 
 140. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text. 
 142. Charlotte S. Alexander and Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law 
Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1093–95 (2014). 
 143. Id. at 1098–99; see also DeChiara, supra note 2, at 433–34 (“For ex-
ample, during union organizing campaigns, employees’ ignorance of the law 
hinders their ability to assess employer anti-union propaganda, thus diluting 
their right to organize. In the non-union setting, employees’ ignorance leads to 
the underutilization of legitimate workplace protests, of the voicing of group 
grievances, and of requests for outside help from government agencies or other 
third parties. In sum, lack of notice of their rights disempowers employees.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 144. Hirsch, supra note 127, at 1148; see also id. at 1147 (describing the 
NLRA’s application to nonunion workers as “one of the best-kept secrets of la-
bor law”). 
 145. See Amanda L. Ireland, Notification of Employee Rights Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act: A Turning Point for the National Labor Relations 
Board, 13 NEV. L.J. 937, 947–48 (2013). On the other hand, sometimes work-
ers overestimate their legal rights, also to their detriment. See Cynthia L. 
Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Mat-
ter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 10 (2002) (“The problem with erroneous employee 
beliefs about [their job security] is that they allow employers to have it both 
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of workers’ rights under the NLRA and other important em-
ployment laws thus improves the chances that workers will ac-
tually receive such information. As Professor Alexander ob-
serves, “From a practical standpoint, no other entity likely has 
the level and consistency of access to workers than does the 
employer.”146 
Government requirements that employers post these notic-
es can also help deter violations of law by educating employers 
about their legal responsibilities.147 Consider, for example, the 
numerous comments received by the National Labor Relations 
Board that opposed its notice-posting rule “precisely because 
the commenters believe[d] that the notice w[ould] increase the 
level of knowledge about the NLRA on the part of employees[,] 
. . . strongly suggest[ing] that the commenters themselves do 
not understand the basic provisions of the NLRA.”148 The Board 
responded that “fear that employees may exercise their statu-
tory rights is not a valid reason for not informing them of their 
rights,” and concluded that the notice-posting rule “may have 
the beneficial side effect of informing employers concerning the 
NLRA’s requirements” and discouraging employers from retali-
 
ways: Employers enjoy the considerable benefits of employee beliefs that they 
are largely protected against unjustified discharge while escaping the costs of 
that legal protection.”); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Infor-
mation: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 133–47 (1997) (documenting how workers overesti-
mate their own job security). 
 146. Alexander, supra note 123, at 526; see also id. at 527 (“Workplace in-
formation-forcing rules may rightly target the employer because of this superi-
or access to information. It is more efficient for the employer to transfer its 
knowledge to the worker, or to be the conduit for the government’s provision of 
knowledge, than for the less informed party to expend the resources in an at-
tempt to inform him- or herself.”). For other examples of government require-
ments that more knowledgeable or powerful speakers bear responsibility for 
disclosures on matters of law as well as fact, see supra note 110. 
 147. See DeChiara, supra note 2, at 434 (“[T]he vast number of employer 
unfair labor practices now committed may diminish if managers had reason to 
believe employees knew of their right to seek relief from the Board.”); Estlund, 
supra note 117, at 781–85 (emphasizing the enforcement benefits of mandato-
ry disclosure); Charlotte Garden, Meta Rights, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 855, 859 
n.17 (2014) (“[F]irst, the process of notifying individuals of their rights could 
serve an educative function for institutions themselves, thereby preventing 
inadvertent violations; and second, having to provide notice makes institutions 
acutely aware that individuals know their rights, which could itself deter vio-
lations.”). 
 148. Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations 
Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,016–17 (Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 104). 
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ating against those who might exercise their NLRA rights.149 
Indeed, many employers as well as workers do not realize that 
the NLRA provides even nonunionized workers with important 
protections. As just one illustration, many employers continue 
to adopt policies prohibiting workers from discussing their pay 
with each other largely because both employers and workers 
are unaware that the NLRA protects concerted activity and 
thus prohibits such pay secrecy policies.150 
This analysis applies not only to requirements that em-
ployers disclose truthful information about workers’ legal 
rights, but also about the terms and conditions of workers’ em-
ployment. Examples include requirements that employers pro-
vide written disclosures about pay, hours, workplace hazards, 
on-the-job injury rates, any contractual job security provisions, 
and available policies related to work-life and work-family is-
sues.151 Here too such factual disclosures both inform workers’ 
job-related decisions and facilitate the enforcement of work-
place law.152 
In short, a listener-centered approach explains the value of 
requiring speakers to make truthful disclosures on matters of 
great import to listeners. This can be the case when the speak-
ers have better—and sometimes exclusive—access to the in-
 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Pay Secrecy/Confidentiality 
Rules and the National Labor Relations Act, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121, 
148–49 (2003); Hirsch, supra note 127, at 1104 (“If employees are unaware of 
the options or legal protections for acting collectively, they are unlikely even to 
consider such action, much less actually attempt it. . . . The reality is that 
most employees are probably unaware of their right to engage in many types 
of collective action, such as sharing salary information with coworkers, much 
less the way in which they can exercise those rights.”). 
 151. See Estlund, supra note 117, at 783–85; Estlund, supra note 13, at 371 
(“Ensuring that such information is disclosed up front—if it can be done at low 
cost and in a manner that renders information usable by workers—should 
generally produce contracts that better match workers and jobs and better sat-
isfy parties’ preferences.”). 
 152. To be sure, however, disclosures can be incomplete and otherwise im-
perfect. For a critical view of disclosure, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. 
Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) 
(arguing that mandatory disclosures too often fail to inform and improve their 
listeners’ decisions). For more optimistic views of disclosures’ effectiveness, see 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN & RICHARD H. THALER, NUDGE 105 (2008) (advocating dis-
closures as an effective policy “nudge”); Hirsch, supra note 127, at 1150 (“[T]he 
labor information gap is so great that narrowing it is an easy target. For most 
employees, a simple notice providing general information about their labor 
rights and, most importantly, identifying the NLRB as a point of contact 
would be a dramatic improvement over the status quo.”). 
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formation as a formal matter (as is the case of certain infor-
mation about the terms and conditions of employment). This 
can also be the case when speakers have better access to the in-
formation as a functional matter (e.g., when they are more 
knowledgeable as repeat players) and are well positioned to de-
liver the message effectively to listeners. 
Nor do these disclosures threaten significant harm to free 
speech interests. The First Amendment harms of government-
compelled disclosures in other settings potentially include inju-
ries to both speakers and listeners: speakers (at least those 
with dignitary interests of their own) can suffer autonomy 
harms if they are forced to mouth beliefs that they do not 
themselves hold, while listeners can experience instrumental 
damage to the quality of their decision making if they are con-
fused about the true source of the contested message or if the 
disclosure is factually inaccurate.153 Compelled disclosures 
about workers’ rights or other working conditions, however, 
rarely threaten these harms. For example, not only did the 
NLRB’s proposed notice-posting rule involve a description of ex-
isting law rather than a statement of opinion, it also made 
clear that the notice represented the government’s speech ra-
ther than the employer’s.154 In other words, employers were not 
required to mouth or affirm a belief they did not hold and they 
remained free to surround the required notice with messages of 
their own. Moreover, because the rule required employers to 
post what was clearly the government’s notice about workers’ 
rights, there was no danger that listeners would be confused 
about the source of the speech. The expressive costs of such dis-
closures are thus very low. 
Relatedly, courts often require the content of compelled 
disclosures to be “factual and uncontroversial,”155 both to pro-
tect listeners from inaccuracy as well as to protect speakers 
from compelled affirmations of belief (which are considerably 
more offensive to speakers’ autonomy interests than compelled 
disclosures of objectively verifiable facts). Disclosures of prova-
 
 153. See Corbin, supra note 80, at 1280–99. 
 154. See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,049 (Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 
C.F.R. pt. 104) (listing the text of the proposed notice, including a reminder 
that it is an “official Government Notice” that “must not be defaced by any-
one”). 
 155. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
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ble fact (such as those regarding specific terms and conditions 
of employment) and accurate descriptions of current law can 
readily satisfy this standard.156 Nevertheless, the challengers in 
National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. NLRB characterized the 
NLRB’s notice-posting rule as impermissibly one-sided and 
“controversial” because it did not devote as much space and de-
tail to workers’ rights not to join a union or engage in other pro-
tected activities as the challengers would have liked.157 In other 
words, under the challengers’ view, a disclosure is impermissi-
bly “controversial” for First Amendment purposes when one 
party does not want the matter discussed in a particular way, 
or at all.158 Such an approach, however, would enable challeng-
 
 156. The Supreme Court made a related point when discussing when a no-
tice’s description of law is (or is not) accurate. See Marquez v. Screen Actors 
Guild, Inc. 525 U.S. 33, 36, 47 (1998) (“[W]e must determine whether a union 
breaches its duty of fair representation when it negotiates a union security 
clause that tracks the language of [the statute] without explaining, in the 
agreement, this Court’s interpretation of that language. We conclude that it 
does not. . . . The logic of petitioner’s argument has no stopping point; it would 
require unions (and all other contract drafters) to spell out all the intricacies 
of every term used in a contract.”). 
 157. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 958 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(“Plaintiffs here [employers] . . . see the poster as one-sided, as favoring union-
ization, because it fails to notify employees, inter alia, of their rights to decer-
tify a union, to refuse to pay dues to a union in a right-to-work state, and to 
object to payment of dues in excess of the amounts required for representa-
tional purposes.” (citations omitted)). The proposed notice actually described 
workers’ NLRA rights as follows:  
Under the NLRA, you have the right to: Organize a union to negotiate 
with your employer concerning your wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment; Form, join or assist a union; Bargain 
collectively through representatives of employees’ own choosing for a 
contract with your employer setting your wages, benefits, hours, and 
other working conditions; Discuss your wages and benefits and other 
terms and conditions of employment or union organizing with your co-
workers or a union; Take action with one or more co-workers to im-
prove your working conditions by, among other means, raising work-
related complaints directly with your employer or with a government 
agency, and seeking help from a union; Strike and picket, depending 
on the purpose or means of the strike or the picketing; Choose not to 
do any of these activities, including joining or remaining a member of 
a union. 
76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,048. The notice then listed a variety of specific activi-
ties by employers as well as by unions that would violate workers’ NLRA 
rights. Id. at 54,048–49. 
 158. See Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 
867, 910 (2015) (“Plainly a mandated disclosure cannot become controversial 
merely because a speaker objects to making it. . . . Nor should mandated fac-
tual disclosures become constitutionally disfavored because they occur in cir-
cumstances of acrimonious political controversy.”). For a discussion of related 
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ers to defeat listeners’ substantial informational interests simp-
ly by manufacturing controversy over what is accurate infor-
mation. For example, such an approach would potentially treat 
the Surgeon General’s requirement that cigarette manufactur-
ers display warnings about the dangers of tobacco as impermis-
sibly one-sided and thus “controversial” in that it fails to note 
that smoking brings many people great pleasure and that some 
smokers live long and healthy lives. An approach more con-
sistent with the protection of listeners’ First Amendment inter-
ests would thus understand “factual and uncontroversial” in 
this context to refer to assertions that are provable (or disprov-
able) as a factual matter in the same way required of contested 
assertions in defamation, perjury, and antifraud law.159 As Rob-
ert Post has explained, “The requirement that information be 
‘uncontroversial’ would therefore seem best interpreted as a de-
scription of the epistemological status of the information that a 
speaker may be required to communicate.”160 In other words, 
here “uncontroversial” should mean factually or empirically un-
controversial rather than politically uncontested. 
In sum, government requirements that employers disclose 
truthful information about workers’ rights and other working 
conditions can provide considerable value to workers as listen-
ers while imposing little, if any, expressive costs. They thus can 
readily satisfy not only rational-basis scrutiny but also inter-
mediate or even exacting scrutiny when appropriately drafted 
 
tactics in other settings, see generally NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, 
MERCHANTS OF DOUBT (2010) (describing how certain commercial movements 
invested in intensive media and lobbying campaigns to cast doubt on science 
that threatened their interests); Yussuf Saloojee & Elif Dagli, Tobacco Indus-
try Tactics for Resisting Public Policy on Health, 78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. 902, 903 (2000) (“[T]he industry established the Tobacco Industry Re-
search Council. . . . Its true purpose was to deliberately confuse the public 
about the risks of smoking. ‘Doubt is our product,’ proclaimed an internal to-
bacco industry document in 1969. ‘Spread doubt over strong scientific evidence 
and the public won’t know what to believe.’”). 
 159. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, Co. 497 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1990) (holding 
that the elements of defamation require a statement that contains a “provably 
false factual connotation . . . sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being 
proved true or false”); Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Deny-
ing: How Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False State-
ments, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 175 (2001) (describing perjury law as targeting 
false and material assertions, “the truth or falsity of which can be ascertained 
by relatively uncontroversial methods”). 
 160. Post, supra note 158. 
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to achieve the government’s strong interest in informing and 
protecting workers.161 
2. Prohibiting Employers’ Lies and Misrepresentations 
In contrast to compelled disclosures’ requirement that em-
ployers engage in more speech, government’s efforts to prohibit 
employers’ lies and misrepresentations may result in less 
speech, and thus may trigger greater First Amendment suspi-
cion.162 Nonetheless, a listener-centered approach helps us rec-
ognize how information and power asymmetries exacerbate the 
harms of employer lies and misrepresentations in ways that 
can justify their regulation consistent with the First Amend-
ment. 
Recall United States v. Alvarez, in which the Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law 
that criminalized a speaker’s false claims that he or she had re-
ceived certain military honors.163 Although the opinions did not 
reach majority agreement on a test for determining when the 
Constitution protects lies from regulation, each opinion attend-
ed to the harms of such lies. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opin-
ion concluded that only harm-causing lies have historically 
been treated as unprotected by the First Amendment (and that 
the Act impermissibly punished lies that did not actually cause 
harm).164 Justice Breyer’s concurrence assessed the harms 
threatened by the targeted lies as well as the harms to free 
speech interests posed by the Act’s enforcement (and found that 
the latter outweighed the former).165 Justice Alito’s dissent con-
cluded that lies have been historically unprotected apart from 
 
 161. See Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Con-
sumer “Right To Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 438–39 (2016) (urging that com-
pelled commercial disclosures receive heightened scrutiny but concluding that 
many such disclosures will survive such scrutiny, especially when motivated 
by government’s substantial interests in consumer protection or regulatory 
enforcement). 
 162. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010) (“The Court has 
explained that disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more comprehen-
sive regulations of speech.”); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 
113–14 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Protection of the robust and free flow of accurate in-
formation is the principal First Amendment justification for protecting com-
mercial speech, and requiring disclosure of truthful information promotes that 
goal. In such a case, then, less exacting scrutiny is required than where truth-
ful, nonmisleading commercial speech is restricted.”). 
 163. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 164. Id. at 2547–51. 
 165. Id. at 2551–56. 
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any harm they cause while also finding that the Act permissi-
bly punished harmful lies.166 In other words, the plurality and 
the dissent would treat harm-causing lies as unprotected by the 
First Amendment, while the concurrence would assess the con-
tested lies’ harms in applying intermediate scrutiny to the gov-
ernment’s regulation of those lies. 
Powerful speakers’ lies can harm their listeners’ interests 
in especially grave ways precisely because of such speakers’ 
power: employers’ lies, for example, can be especially costly to 
workers in stark monetary terms.167 As discussed below, infor-
mation and power asymmetries explain those lies’ great capaci-
ty for harm and thus why First Amendment doctrine should 
permit the regulation of lies within the listener-centered em-
ployment relationship.168 These harms include most prominent-
ly the harms of coercion and manipulation, which describe dif-
ferent ways in which a liar may seek to bend her listener’s will 
for her own purposes—the first through power and the second 
through the distortion of information.169 
First, greater attention to the power asymmetries between 
speakers and listeners can inform our understanding of when 
and how employers’ lies can inflict the harms of coercion. 
Courts and commentators have extensively examined this pos-
sibility in the context of lies by law enforcement officers who 
have the power to enforce sanctions against, or to control the 
physical liberty of, listeners.170 More specifically, when deter-
 
 166. Id. at 2556–65. 
 167. See Greenfield, supra note 1, at 750 (“[W]hen a company defrauds an 
investor about an investment, the damage is to savings. When a company de-
frauds a worker about her work, the damage is to subsistence.”). 
 168. Those harms may mean either that these lies are unprotected by the 
First Amendment (under the approach advocated by the Alvarez plurality and 
dissent) or that their harm justifies their regulation under intermediate scru-
tiny (under the approach advocated by the concurrence). 
 169. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING 93–96 (2006) 
(distinguishing the harms of coercion and exploitation). This Article focuses on 
employers’ lies, misrepresentations, and nondisclosures about workers’ legal 
rights and working conditions and the harms they inflict to workers’ autonomy 
and livelihood. Note that some employer lies about other topics can inflict oth-
er sorts of harms—for example, employers’ defamatory lies about employees 
that can inflict reputational harms. See, e.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon, & 
Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding arbitrator’s award against 
employer for its defamatory statements about employee). 
 170. To be sure, some may argue that law enforcement officers’ lies told to 
identify wrongdoing and thus to protect the public interest are considerably 
less harmful than employers’ lies told to advance their own interest at the ex-
pense of workers. I discuss the law enforcement context here simply to illus-
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mining whether police interrogators’ lies deprive their targets 
of constitutionally protected liberties, the Court seeks to de-
termine whether the lies take the form of “coercion, not mere 
strategic deception,” such that they render a confession (or oth-
er decision to waive a constitutional right) involuntary.171 In as-
sessing whether law enforcement officers’ lies are impermissi-
bly coercive, courts generally try to determine whether their 
target could reasonably be expected to resist them with silence 
rather than with an incriminating response or other waiver of a 
constitutional right.172 More specifically, courts generally treat 
police interrogators’ lies to their targets about available legal 
rights as coercing the waiver of such rights and thus violating 
constitutional due process protections.173 In other words, com-
paratively powerful speakers’ lies about the existence of, or the 
consequences of exercising, legal rights can be the practical 
equivalent of denying those rights altogether. For similar rea-
sons, employers’ lies about workers’ legal rights can effectively 
frustrate the exercise of those rights because, as a functional 
matter, the employer is the entity that will recognize or deny 
them.174 
Powerful speakers’ lies about other matters can also carry 
coercive potential when delivered in settings that offer listeners 
limited meaningful opportunities for exit or voice—as is the 
case in certain custodial or otherwise captive settings. Atten-
tion to the ways in which power dynamics operate in the work-
place enables us to understand a broader range of employer lies 
as coercive and thus sufficiently harmful to justify their regula-
 
trate the ways in which powerful speakers’ lies—regardless of their self-
regarding or other-regarding motive—may coerce their listeners. 
 171. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (“Miranda for-
bids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect’s 
misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner. . . . Ploys to mislead 
a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level 
of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda’s concerns.”). 
 172. Again, the line between coercive lies and those that are instead “mere-
ly” deceptive remains subject to vigorous dispute. Justices Marshall and Ste-
vens, for example, are among those to have urged the Court to recognize a 
broader range of police lies as unconstitutionally coercive. See Norton, supra 
note 35, at 94–95 (describing disagreements over whether and when police lies 
should be considered impermissibly coercive in violation of the Due Process 
Clause). 
 173. See Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 1275, 1276–86 (2007). 
 174. See DeChiara, supra note 2, at 455–56 (describing employers’ misrep-
resentations to workers about the legal scope of unions’ power in ways likely to 
shape workers’ votes about unionization). 
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tion consistent with the First Amendment (and § 8(c) of the 
NLRA).175 For example, employers’ lies and misrepresentations 
carry great coercive potential when delivered at employers’ 
“captive audience” meetings on the job that workers are re-
quired to attend as a condition of employment and that offer no 
opportunity for escape or rebuttal.176 
Second, even in the absence of coercion, greater attention 
to information asymmetries between speakers and listeners can 
enlighten our understanding of when and how employers’ lies 
exploit such asymmetries to manipulate workers’ choices about 
matters of great life importance. For instance, although coer-
cion may be less likely with respect to employer speech that 
takes place away from the workplace, workers’ informational 
disadvantage about such matters remains. Powerful speakers’ 
lies can thus be especially successful in manipulating listeners 
when the speaker has unique or privileged access to the infor-
mation in question compared to the listener and where those 
lies thus may be more likely to be believed and less subject to 
rebuttal by counterspeech.177 
Recall, for example, the allegations that Nike lied about its 
working conditions in defending itself against reports that it 
supported sweatshop labor and other abusive workplace prac-
tices overseas.178 The Nike case presented a hard First Amend-
ment problem under current doctrine because of its setting and 
audience: it involved a commercial speaker’s efforts to shape 
listeners’ decisions to protect its economic interests by making 
alleged misrepresentations to a broad public audience about its 
 
 175. As discussed supra notes 26–42 and accompanying text, however, in 
recent decades courts and the NLRB have become increasingly slow to view 
employers’ lies (and other employer speech) as impermissibly coercive. 
 176. Here I focus specifically on employers’ lies and misrepresentations 
about workers’ rights and other working conditions. A number of commenta-
tors have urged that employers’ antiunion speech more generally should al-
ways be considered impermissibly coercive when delivered to a “captive audi-
ence.” See, e.g., Roger C. Hartley, Freedom Not To Listen: A Constitutional 
Analysis of Compulsory Indoctrination Through Workplace Captive Audience 
Meetings, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. LAW 65 (2010); Paul M. Secunda, The 
Contemporary “Fist Inside the Velvet Glove”: Employer Captive Audience Meet-
ings Under the NLRA, 5 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 385 (2010). 
 177. See Charlotte S. Alexander, Transparency and Transmission: Theoriz-
ing Information’s Role in Regulatory and Market Responses to Workplace Prob-
lems, 48 CONN. L. REV. 177, 189–97 (2015) (describing “facts about on-the-
ground conditions of work that are held exclusively by the employer or to 
which the employer blocks access,” such as “information about employees’ oc-
cupational health risks, pay and benefits, employee status, and job security”). 
 178. See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
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employment practices that had become a topic of public policy 
debate. On one hand, Nike’s speech could be characterized as 
factual commercial speech about its own working conditions, 
directed at least in part to present or prospective workers as 
well as to consumers. On the other hand, Nike’s assertions 
could also be characterized as employer speech on a matter of 
public concern to a broad audience not limited to workers or 
consumers. 
To be sure, some thoughtful commentators describe such 
speech as inevitably commercial and thus subject to regula-
tion.179 But understanding employer speech as occurring within 
a listener-centered relationship offers an alternative frame-
work for explaining when and why alleged lies of this sort 
should be regulable apart from their characterization as com-
mercial or political, or of private or public concern. Key to this 
determination is whether the employer speaks to an audience 
that includes workers on an issue material to workers’ decision 
making to which it has unique informational access; in other 
words, whether workers as listeners suffer information asym-
metries such that we should have heightened expectations of 
employers’ sincerity and accuracy. For these reasons, Seana 
Shiffrin has explained that speakers like Nike who have great-
er informational access to the matter in question should be held 
to bear greater responsibilities to their listeners: 
Although the discussion of this case has focused on Nike’s status as a 
commercial speaker (and a corporate, nonindividual speaker), it may 
be independently relevant that Nike is an expert on conditions in its 
own factories, and this fact may subject it to special requirements of 
accuracy about facts within its expertise. A related argument is that 
Nike had special access to information about its own factories and the 
legal ability to exclude others who wished to visit to verify or discon-
firm Nike’s allegations, giving Nike a special obligation of accuracy.180 
In other words, what matters under a listener-based 
framework is not the characterization of the employers’ alleged 
lies as political or commercial or something else, but instead 
whether they are likely to exploit workers’ informational disad-
vantage and thus manipulate decisions about whether to take 
 
 179. See PIETY, supra note 74, at 12 (suggesting that commercial actors’ 
speech is always commercial and thus subject to less First Amendment protec-
tion from regulation). 
 180. SHIFFRIN, supra note 95, at 132 n.28; see also Shiffrin, supra note 99, 
at 27 n.45 (“Nike had a special obligation of accuracy that Nike is an expert on 
conditions in its own factories, with special access to information and the legal 
ability to exclude others who wished to visit to verify or disconfirm Nike’s alle-
gations.”). 
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or keep a job or engage in protected activity. These lies’ capaci-
ty to inflict manipulative harm turns on whether they exploit 
information asymmetries to workers’ detriment as listeners ra-
ther than on whether their audience also includes the broader 
public. To be sure, Nike’s alleged lies may not have manipulat-
ed decisions by American workers because they concerned the 
overseas treatment of other workers. But recall the related hy-
pothetical posed earlier, in which an employer alleged to violate 
U.S. employment law with respect to its workers on American 
soil falsely denies those allegations in a variety of communica-
tions directed to current and prospective workers as well as to 
the broader public.181 Such lies can threaten manipulative harm 
to workers’ important life decisions. 
Indeed, securities and consumer protection law regulate 
precisely the same sorts of lies and misrepresentations to pre-
vent the manipulation of listeners who suffer related infor-
mation asymmetries. For example, securities law prohibits cor-
porations’ knowing or reckless misrepresentations about their 
compliance with federal employment law even when directed to 
a broad public audience, so long as their listeners (for example, 
actual or prospective buyers or sellers of securities) can prove 
sufficient harm in the form of materiality and detrimental reli-
ance.182 Shareholder elections offer another parallel, in which 
lies and misrepresentations by comparatively knowledgeable 
speakers are heavily regulated to protect shareholders’ infor-
mational interests as listeners regardless of whether those as-
sertions are directed to broad or narrow audiences.183 
 
 181. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 182. See Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675 (4th Cir. 1999) (conclud-
ing that the plaintiff could show detrimental reliance on a corporation’s al-
leged misrepresentations about the legality of its labor practices delivered to 
the general public via press releases as required by Rule 10b-5, but did not 
show that such misrepresentations were material to its decisions to buy or sell 
securities); see also Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. 
Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1327–28 (2015) (indicating that a CEO’s 
statement of belief that the company’s contracts complied with applicable law 
could be actionable under § 11 of the Securities Act either if the speaker did 
not actually hold that belief or if the statement conveyed untrue facts about 
the basis for the speaker’s belief ). 
 183. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits materially false or mis-
leading statements or omissions and requires certain affirmative disclosures 
related to proxy elections. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) 
(“The purpose of [the statutes] is to prevent management or others from ob-
taining authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate 
disclosure.”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2016) (prohibiting false or misleading 
statements); see also Greenfield, supra note 1, at 726–30 (describing securities 
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In short, under a listener-centered approach, employers’ 
lies and misrepresentations about workers’ rights and other 
working conditions should be regulable to prevent the harms of 
manipulation when they concern a matter to which the employ-
er has stronger (and sometimes exclusive) informational access 
and when they are material to workers’ decisions, regardless of 
whether they take place in communications directed only to 
workers or instead in those that also include broader public au-
diences.184 For this reason, a listener-centered approach ex-
plains why the First Amendment should permit the NLRB to 
be quicker to regulate lies in the context of union representa-
tion elections given those lies’ substantial capacity to distort or 
manipulate workers’ choices through information differentials. 
As Matthew Bodie has urged:  
Unlike perhaps every other regime of commercial regulation, the 
Board’s regulation of the union representation election does not pe-
nalize for fraud. This failure is anathema to the need for employees to 
trust the information they are getting from unions and employers. . . . 
The Board, should, at the least, treat material misrepresentations as 
grounds for overturning an election.185 
To be sure, proposals to regulate employers’ lies and mis-
representations may trigger an understandable search for lim-
iting principles. But recall that a listener-centered approach to 
the regulation of truth and lies applies only to those relation-
ships—like those between employers and workers—with cer-
 
law restrictions on fraudulent speech); Neuborne, supra note 81, at 42–62 
(same). 
 184. See, e.g., Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 141–43 (4th Cir. 2014) (describ-
ing an employer’s lies to her prospective employee about the job’s pay, hours, 
benefits, and other working conditions that induced the applicant to take a job 
to her great detriment). 
 185. Matthew T. Bodie, Mandatory Disclosure in the Market for Union Rep-
resentation, 5 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 617, 641–42 (2010). For examples of such 
material misrepresentations placed in historical context, see Ahmed A. White, 
The Wagner Act on Trial: The 1937 “Little Steel” Strike and the Limits of New 
Deal Reform 49 n.243, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2443447 (describing “patently false or vastly exaggerated” claims by employers 
that unions were controlled by corrupt or communist influences); id. at 57 
(“The [employer] campaign was founded on a remarkably disingenuous but 
effective inversion of the basic facts of the strike, which presented the compa-
nies and their loyal employees—and by extension employers and anti-union 
workers generally—as the victims of a campaign of violence and coercion . . . 
supported in various ways by the Board and the Wagner Act.”); Ahmed A. 
White, Workers Disarmed: The Campaign Against Mass Picketing and the Di-
lemma of Liberal Labor Rights, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 59, 62 (2014) (de-
scribing propaganda efforts by employers and their allies to characterize la-
bor’s effective strategy of mass picketing as “anticipatorily violent”). 
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tain “features of the moral and epistemic environment” that 
should “impose a heightened duty of care on the speaker for the 
listeners’ mental contents.”186 Moreover, this Article addresses 
only the regulation of truth and lies on objectively verifiable 
matters to which speakers have greater (and sometimes even 
exclusive) informational access.187 This Article does not address 
other types of content-based speech regulation within these re-
lationships. Indeed, governmental efforts to regulate truthful 
speech in listener-centered relationships (for example, profes-
sionals’ speech to their patients) may appropriately trigger 
greater First Amendment suspicion.188 Again, a listener-
centered approach supports the protection of speech in these 
relationships that furthers listeners’ First Amendment inter-
ests, while permitting the regulation of speech that frustrates 
those interests. In the commercial speech context, for example, 
the Court has sought to achieve this balance by treating com-
mercial speech that is false, misleading, or related to illegal ac-
tivity as entirely unprotected by the First Amendment, while 
applying intermediate scrutiny to government’s regulation of 
truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech.189 
Some may fear that the government’s regulation of em-
ployers’ truth and lies offends a “negative” or “anti-
paternalistic” understanding of the First Amendment that 
would limit the government’s power to declare itself the arbiter 
of truth.190 But, of course, powerful speakers’ manipulative lies 
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themselves frustrate listeners’ autonomy and are thus pater-
nalistic in their efforts to bend the listener’s will to that of the 
speaker.191 For these reasons, government’s regulation of lies 
and misrepresentations can itself be understood as 
antipaternalistic by privileging listeners’ core First Amend-
ment interests.192 
One can also anticipate related institutional competence 
concerns—that is, concerns that courts are not well positioned 
to determine the truth or falsity of employer speech about 
workers’ rights or other terms and conditions of employment. 
But courts make similarly complex assessments of assertions’ 
accuracy in a wide range of constitutional, statutory, and com-
mon law contexts. Gregory Klass, for example, has detailed a 
large and well-established “law of deception” (including “the 
torts of deceit, negligent misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and 
 
tirely negative” in that it “does not rest on the affirmative claim that free 
speech will lead to any particular social or political benefits” but instead em-
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defamation; criminal fraud statutes; securities law, which in-
cludes both disclosure duties and penalties for false state-
ments”) that calls upon courts to make a variety of similar de-
terminations regarding falsity and state of mind.193 
Finally, some may wonder whether the government’s regu-
lation of employers’ truth and lies threatens to chill valuable 
speech. Here too these concerns are dramatically lessened with 
respect to the regulation of employers’ truth and lies on objec-
tively verifiable matters to which they have greater (and some-
times even exclusive) informational access, and in settings 
where listeners’ opportunities for counterspeech and exit are 
constrained. Restrictions on this relatively narrow swath of 
speech pose less potential for chilling valuable expression than 
do restrictions that sweep more broadly. Moreover, as the 
Court has recognized in the context of commercial speech, 
chilling may be considerably less likely with respect to powerful 
speakers—like employers—that have strong incentives and op-
portunities to engage in continued speech.194 
  CONCLUSION   
The longstanding need for a coherent First Amendment 
theory of employer speech is now even more pressing in light of 
the recent antiregulatory movement to expand free speech pro-
tections for corporate and other commercial speakers that 
threatens to undercut government’s efforts to inform and em-
power workers. This Article asserts that a focus on employer 
speech as occurring within a listener-centered relationship bet-
ter and more coherently furthers key First Amendment values 
than do efforts to force employer speech to fit within existing 
and often unsatisfactory constitutional categories. More specifi-
cally, this Article proposes a theory of employer speech that 
recognizes that this expression occurs within a communicative 
relationship that involves information and power asymmetries 
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where workers’ First Amendment interests as listeners are 
frustrated by employers’ lies and nondisclosures. This Article 
concludes that the First Amendment should be understood to 
permit government to require employers to make truthful dis-
closure about workers’ legal rights and other working condi-
tions, as well as to prohibit employer lies or misrepresentations 
about these matters that threaten to coerce or manipulate 
workers’ choices. 
